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Foreword
One in three residents of the Kyrgyz Republic is a young person aged between 14 and 28 years. The emergence of a peaceful 
and prosperous Kyrgyzstan, providing justice for 
all its citizens, is predicated on engagement with 
and investment in today’s young generation. Yet 
young people face many challenges. An inefficient 
and outdated education system significantly limits 
the potential for human development which is 
so essential for a land-locked and mountainous 
country that is by-passed by today’s global 
trading routes. Misinterpretation of the cultural 
richness of its people, straying away from the 
territory’s historical diversity and tolerance, and 
veering towards a narrative of control of some 
over others that includes systemic violation of 
the rights of adolescent girls and young women, 
runs counter to efforts at building an advanced 
and stable Kyrgyzstan where men and women can 
grow to deploy their comparative advantages in 
the global knowledge economy. Twenty-five years 
after independence the Kyrgyz Republic is at a 
crossroads. 
 Will those coming of age now be committed 
to a modern, multi-ethnic society that cherishes 
human rights and freedom, or will those exploiting 
economic difficulties and a spiritual vacuum gain 
the upper hand, divide the country and take it 
backwards? UN Women believes that moving 
towards more gender equality has a catalytic effect 
on many development issues. Without progress 
towards gender equality, through the tool of 
women’s empowerment, the global development 
agenda is unlikely to be met in Kyrgyzstan and 
elsewhere by 2030, when today’s young generation 
will be in their 30s and 40s and entering key 
decision-making positions. Without emphasis on 
the empowerment of women and girls, progress 
on sustainable development will remain elusive. 
Tools that can help include strict law enforcement 
to protect girls against violence, as well as gender-
responsive budgeting to ensure that the country’s 
finances serve everyone and give real opportunity 
to women to develop skills and talents. Temporary 
measures such as gender and youth quotas in 
local assemblies and the national parliament may 
also be required.
 Under its Building a Constituency for 
Peace project, which is focused on the social and 
economic empowerment of youth and funded 
by the UN Peacebuilding Fund, UN Women 
conducted research on key cultural, social, 
educational and economic factors negatively 
affecting the empowerment of young women 
aged 14 to 28 in Kyrgyzstan, and into the creation 
of an environment that would actively enable their 
empowerment. 
 Two research areas were prioritised for 
investigation, namely “professional choices” and 
“adolescents’/sexual and reproductive health and 
marriage choices”, with a focus on adolescent 
girls and young women aged 14-28. Some 70% 
of respondents were female, and 30% male. 
Combined qualitative and quantitative research 
was conducted in all nine administrative regions of 
Kyrgyzstan. Respondents from the three largest and 
various smaller ethnic groups were interviewed. 
The intent was to build a multi-faceted picture 
that also identified and highlighted best practices 
and positive examples of girl empowerment for 
subsequent promotion and replication.
 The research was carried out by a multi-
ethnic team of young, mainly female, researchers 
from Kyrgyzstan. In order to ensure that all 
phases of the research met the highest academic 
standards, a comprehensive induction and 
Re
se
ar
ch
 o
n 
Pr
of
es
si
on
al
 a
nd
 M
ar
ria
ge
 C
ho
ic
es
 o
f Y
ou
th
 in
 K
yr
gy
zs
ta
n
6
training programme was designed and delivered 
prior to each phase of the project by the principal 
researcher, herself a native of Kyrgyzstan currently 
completing her PhD in Germany. All phases of 
the research, including preparing methodology 
and research tools, interviewing, transcribing 
interviews, coding and analysis were thus carried 
out by this group of highly motivated and deeply 
committed researchers contracted by the UN 
Women Kyrgyzstan Republic Country Office. 
The final report, which was based on the various 
component reports prepared by the research team 
and the data collected by them, was then written 
by an international academic with extensive 
topical research experience in the country. This 
publication describes this process in more detail. 
 Our objective was to establish 
comprehensive and actionable national level 
data to understand the prevailing attitudes, 
knowledge and practices leading to structural 
and socially accepted discrimination against girls 
and young women aged 14-28. There was a lack 
of comprehensive, countrywide data on factors 
contributing to the disempowerment of girls and 
young women in this age range. Our research was 
designed to fill this gap, and to identify region-
specific and age group-specific tendencies and 
patterns of gender inequality. The research team 
was keen to identify and document positive 
examples of empowerment of girls and young 
women who have successfully overcome systemic 
constraints. In fact, many such cases were identified, 
along with the specific conditions that enabled 
their success. This is highly valuable information 
for both policy-makers and development planners 
whose aim is to help young women attain their 
potential and become informed decision-makers. 
 As our study results have confirmed, 
gender role perceptions in Kyrgyzstan are still 
predominantly organised by sex and age, a 
hallmark of a patriarchal society. Among Kyrgyz 
youth, the socially accepted model of life is of the 
male as breadwinner and the female taking care 
of household duties and children. This notion 
is, however, being challenged by young women 
from urban areas who have marketable skills, and 
by those sent into migration abroad to support 
families back home. Girls may also escape family 
pressure to marry by opting for labour migration. 
While they may be exposed to violence during 
migration, upon their return they are markedly 
empowered, although often stereotyped as ‘easy’ 
girls, who have been exposed to ‘too much’ 
freedom. They lack a supportive environment in 
which to deploy their new skills in order to make 
a positive contribution to society and to economic 
progress. 
 Women tend to marry earlier, at an average 
age of 20.6 years against 24.5 years among men. 
Domestic violence, bride-kidnapping and early 
marriage are pervasive forms of violence against 
girls and women that still prevail in Kyrgyzstan. 
Impunity and patchy law enforcement in such cases 
constitute both a psychological and an economic 
cost for society. 
 While many young women are on the 
receiving end of violence, in the event of bride-
kidnapping it is often the prospective mother-in-
law - in all likelihood having once been kidnapped 
herself - who puts her son up to kidnapping a 
girl. Female relatives of the groom will then force 
the girl into submission and she often ends up in 
servitude to the abducting family. Her marriage 
will probably involve only a religious ceremony. 
Avoiding civil registration makes it difficult for 
her to secure both her and her children’s rights in 
case of her running away. But after being detained 
for just one night the girl, now deemed ‘impure’, 
cannot return to her parents for the shame it may 
bring upon them. This is perhaps the greatest 
violation of her rights. It is hoped that our research 
will help inform behaviour change communication 
strategies in order to counter such harmful 
practices and beliefs, and that this in turn will give 
impetus to the justice sector to carry out its duties 
under the Constitution and the Criminal Code.
 The generally poor and restricted access 
for adolescents to sexual and reproductive 
health education and services leaves young 
women vulnerable to sexually transmitted 
infections, unintended pregnancies, adolescent 
childbearing, sexual coercion and violence. These 
factors when combined with limited opportunities 
for educational and professional self-realisation 
mean that many young women become victims, 
rather than actors and change agents for a more 
progressive society that cherishes and promotes 
women’s contributions in all spheres of public 
life.
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 UN Women is dedicated to facilitating 
behaviour change in society so that having young 
women and men command the knowledge 
and freedom to make informed choices about 
their lives becomes the norm. To this end, the 
findings of our study provide policy-makers and 
development partners with reliable intelligence on 
how to design policy and practical interventions 
which will bridge the prevailing gap between 
socially constructed attitudes and public practices 
towards gender equality on the one hand, and 
constitutional guarantees of gender equality and 
human rights on the other. 
 It is necessary to give confidence to young 
women so that they can explore their professional 
opportunities and build a sense of self-worth 
before settling on marriage. It is equally necessary 
to involve young men in this work so that they can 
appreciate self-respect and a sense of purpose in 
young women, and commit to a partnership of 
equality that will be a stable basis for marriage and 
establishing a family.
 On behalf of the UN Women Country 
Office, I would like to thank first and foremost the 
research team, under the inspiring leadership of Ms. 
AikokulMaksutova, for their strong commitment, 
hard work and the convincing research produced. 
Thanks go to the principal donor, the United 
Nations Peacebuilding Fund, and the Joint Steering 
Committee and its Secretariat in Kyrgyzstan. UN 
Women appreciates the continuous support 
of its state partners, especially the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Development, and its partners 
in civil society, all of whom are striving with us 
for more gender equality and growing female 
empowerment. Any faults with the research, of 
course, lie with the UN Women Country Office, 
which coordinated and closely supported this 
work, ensuring that it met ethical requirements 
and was carried out objectively.
 Besides this final analytical report, a 
number of component reports on gender 
perceptions and practices across different ethnic 
groups and the source data collected are available 
to bona-fide researchers. We invite readers of the 
report to explore further recommendations for 
follow-up action. The UN Women Country Office 
is interested in wide dissemination of this research 
and welcomes discussion and use of it. 
 UN Women in its policy advisory function, 
and in its programmes and projects, will apply 
the knowledge gained from this research. We 
will also continue to focus on preparing young 
researchers for conducting such research and 
building analytical skills. The development of 
analytical thinking capacity is not a priority of the 
current education system which, as our research 
has shown, needs to develop more of a focus on 
life and livelihoods skills in order to adequately 
prepare young women and men for their journey 
to self-realisation and thus happiness, which in 
turn will lead to a strong and stable nation. 
 I hope that reviewing our research will 
inspire readers to commit to and work towards 
enhancing the opportunities of young women 
and men in Kyrgyzstan so that they may be in a 
position to make informed choices about their 
lives which will lead to more participation of young 
people in public life, and ultimately to prosperity 
and peace. 
Gerald Gunther
Representative
UN Women Kyrgyz Republic Country Office 
January 2017
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How the research 
was conducted
TThe methodological design of the present study underwent several modifications throughout the research cycle, while still 
adhering to the original research questions and 
the thematic pillars deduced from the literature 
review. In the beginning, the study was designed 
as quantitative research, with integrated elements 
of qualitative methods. The team of researchers 
selected a standardized questionnaire that 
incorporated open-ended questions to deepen 
their understanding of selected research items. 
While discussing the applicability of the proposed 
design, the researchers came to the decision that, 
first, gender-specific, personal, and culturally 
sensitive questions could not be explored in-depth 
via a quantitative method, and, second, they did 
not have sufficient time resources to conduct both 
a quantitative survey and qualitative research that 
would meet their research needs. To find an adequate 
compromise between research depth and coverage, 
the team decided to switch its design to a two-stage 
qualitative study with a substantive sample size. 
Thus a qualitative research method was adopted for 
primary data collection, which comprised individual 
problem-centred interviews (PCI) and focus group 
discussions (FGD). The research thus proceeded 
along seven consecutive steps, addressed in detail 
below and illustrated in the following flowchart:
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 Development of the 
 research design
 As elaborated above, the research design 
was the product of intensive discussions among 
researchers and then adjustments based on 
research needs and project resources. One of 
the major factors that influenced the selection 
of appropriate data collection tools and 
instruments for data processing and analysis 
was the availability of researchers in Kyrgyzstan 
who met the minimal qualifications to carry out 
the research, from data collection to analysis. 
The human resource pool was quite limited, for 
several reasons. First, several qualified scholars 
were either already fully employed or involved in 
parallel research projects. Second, there are only 
two or three universities in Kyrgyzstan that offer 
sociology or anthropology degrees. Most of the 
graduates of these programs either move into 
other professions due to limited job opportunities 
in the domestic labour market, or leave the 
country. This means that for us to work with the 
available stock of young researchers, we had to 
lower the qualification standards for researchers 
and recruit young professionals with backgrounds 
in the social sciences or other relevant fields but 
with only limited experience with qualitative 
research. Therefore, the assembled team of 
researchers needed systematic and sequential 
training throughout the research process.
 Field research of stage 1
 Before field research began, external 
researchers and key UN Women staff members 
had reviewed the research design. Based on the 
final approved version, interview guides for PCI 
in Kyrgyz, Russian, and Uzbek were developed 
and pre-tested. Pre-testing the research tools 
was essential for several reasons, including 
accurately planning the time that would be 
required for the field stay. It was determined 
from the beginning that the assembled team of 
young researchers not only should be involved 
in selected research tasks - for example, data 
collection and processing - but should also go 
through all the relevant research steps and gain 
full-fledged research experience. Thus, the team 
of young researchers initially assembled enrolled 
in a five-day training course on research design, 
methodology, data collection tools, and essentials 
of conducting field research, documentation, 
and initial data processing. The latter included 
processing field notes, interview protocols, and 
transcribing interviews. Although transcription 
was tedious and time-consuming and could have 
been commissioned to a transcription company, 
as is usually done in large studies, we preferred to 
let the researchers experience as many research 
milestones as possible.
Data processing of stage 1
 As soon as primary field data was collected 
and transcribed, the next step was data processing, 
with a view to organizing and systematizing the 
qualitative data across ethnic lines, thematic pillars, 
categories, and codes. Decisions related to data 
processing and analysis, and their justifications, 
are provided in the project documentation. Only 
selected field researchers were involved in data 
processing. Some of the field researchers could 
no longer stay on the project for various private 
reasons; the others were evaluated according 
to their output quality, which was continuously 
assessed by quality control supervisors during the 
field research. As a result, eight field researchers 
were invited for further involvement and 
corresponding capacitation.
 We decided to process the entire body of 
raw data through line-by-line coding to ensure 
that losing important insights while segregating 
certain data could be avoided, since the process 
of data reduction is always subjective and, to a 
certain degree, biased. The risk of data loss was 
increased in our case by the fact that the data 
was to be processed by young researchers with 
little research background. To minimize the risk, 
we decided to split the team of researchers into 
four component groups and code and categorize 
the correspondingly allocated data stock in an 
intensive in-group exchange. This meant that 
all the deductive and inductive codes processed 
were discussed within the groups, and cross-
cutting issues were elaborated in general team 
meetings. 
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 Another important aspect of data 
processing worth highlighting is that all component 
groups received a similar tree of codes deducted 
from interview guidelines, which was then 
revised, expanded, and adapted to component 
specifications. This was a necessary step to ensure 
that the initially defined research foci, including 
sub-questions under scrutiny, would be addressed 
to an equal degree by all components, in line with 
newly introduced aspects of the research. The 
selected researchers were correspondingly trained 
on how to process data using a computerized 
qualitative data analysis software, MAXQDA. 
Training addressed the following issues: creation 
of projects; exporting documents; developing a 
code tree; organizing the code tree into categories, 
codes, and sub-codes; coding techniques; writing 
analytical memos to codes, documents, and 
codings; working with different tables; and using 
visual tools and variables.
Field research and data 
processing of stage 2
 During the data coding, as discussed 
above, the researchers met regularly in component 
or team meetings where they not only discussed 
process-related issues, but also identified a 
number of salient features of the data (codes, sub-
codes, cases) that would need to be examined 
more deeply and carefully in certain socio-cultural 
contexts via the focus group discussions planned 
for research stage 2. Based on purely inductive 
initial findings of research stage 1, guidelines for 
contextually adapted focus group discussions 
were developed and reviewed within the team of 
researchers. As a result, several researchers were 
offered ad-hoc training on how to conduct focus 
group discussions and were then dispatched to 
the field. The FGD data was then processed and 
analyzed, according to the methodology applied 
during research stage 1.
 Data triangulation
 In this step, the initial findings of stages 
1 and 2 were reviewed as a set, and compared 
against and correlated with each other to give 
the researchers a better understanding of the 
research subjects under scrutiny and to increase 
the credibility and validity of the overall results. As 
this task requires higher research qualifications and 
more advanced analytical skills, it was conducted 
by the senior research advisor.
Component report 
writing
 To systematize the report-writing process 
within separate component groups and to foster 
intercomponent exchange and communication, a 
writing workshop for analysts was organised so that 
they could finalize draft reports through ongoing 
reviews and editing. Common problems discussed 
during feedback meetings included clustering 
the findings into a higher level of abstraction 
and synthesizing them into a narrative, reading 
quantitative data and integrating them into the 
report, and forming ideas and concepts.
Final academic report 
writing
 Based on the final drafts of component 
reports (Kyrgyz, Russian, Uzbek, and Other 
Minorities), the senior analyst wrote a final academic 
report, synthesizing cross-component research 
findings to arrive at conceptual ideas. After finishing 
the report, the senior analyst provided a feedback 
session to the involved analysts, evaluating both 
their individual outputs and how the research was 
designed and implemented, focusing on strengths 
and lessons learned.
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No Qualitative: training sessions Quantitative: number of trained segments
1. Research design and research field preparation:
Design: development of research question(s), research pillars, (in)
dependent variables, integrated deductive codes;
Methodology: general methodological approaches, data collection tools, 
sampling strategy, pretesting instruments;
Field research: gaining field access, recording field data, interviewing 
techniques, quality control, logistics;
Transcription: techniques, rules, practice;
Research ethics
12 field researchers
2 quality-control supervisors
1 research advisor
2. Qualitative data processing on MAXQDA:
Project management: creating, deleting, merging, exporting, teamwork;
Coding: simple coding, In-Vivo, colour, emoticodes;
Memo-writing: data reduction and initial analysis, data categorization, 
regrouping;
Variables: document and code variables, export/import of variables, creating 
and managing variables, quantification of qualitative data;
Analysis: summaries, cross-tables, typology tables, segment matrix;
Visual tools: MaxMaps, Document Portrait, Code-Matrix. Browser, Codeline
9 analysts
1 research advisor
3. Focus group discussions:
Instruments: context-bound FGD guides;
Management of group dynamics, guiding skills;
Field access, logistics and research ethics
4 field researchers 
1 research advisor 
4. Qualitative data analysis:
Identifying thematic patterns, interrelationships among patterns, 
synthesizing them onto a conceptual level;
Triangulation: source, method and data;
Academic writing techniques: organizing a report in chapters and 
paragraphs, formulation of ideas, citation principles, formatting and wording.
8 analysts 
1 research advisor
The following table summarizes the qualitative and 
quantitative project outputs in relation to researchers’ capacities:
Prepared by Aikokul Maksutova
Re
se
ar
ch
 o
n 
Pr
of
es
si
on
al
 a
nd
 M
ar
ria
ge
 C
ho
ic
es
 o
f Y
ou
th
 in
 K
yr
gy
zs
ta
n
12
List of Abbreviations
and Acronyms
A/SRH Adolescents Sexual and Reproductive Health
FGD Focus group discussion
GSPS Gender in Society Perceptions Study
IOM International Organization for Migration
ORT Obshcherespublikanskoye testirovanie - National University Admissions Test
PBSO United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office
PCI Problem-centred interview
STD Sexually transmitted diseases
UNFPA United Nations Population Fund
UN Women United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women
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Executive Summary
DISPLAYS OF PATRIARCHY
AND FEMALE VIGOUR
Research Report prepared by Dr. Philipp Schröder
In 2015 UN Women in partnership with other UN and Government entities conducted the Gender in Society Perception Study (GSPS). 
At the same time UN Women decided to also 
conduct research specifically on professional 
and marriage choices of youth in Kyrgyzstan to 
understand the prevailing knowledge, attitudes 
and practices leading to structural and socially 
accepted discrimination against girls and 
young women, aged 14-28, in contemporary 
Kyrgyzstan. As its primary outputs, the study 
shall identify opportunities and strategies for 
equal participation and empowerment of girls 
and young women in community level processes 
and serve as a foundation to introduce 
workable, gender-sensitive legal acts and policy 
frameworks.
 Methodology and Concept
 The two major thematic pillars of this study 
concerned (1) ‘Professional Choices of Girls and 
Young Women’ and (2) ‘Marriage and Adolescents’ 
Sexual and Reproductive Health (A/SRH) Choices’. 
In previous studies on youth in Kyrgyzstan, these 
topics have either remained unaddressed or did 
not explicitly scrutinise gender distortions. 
 Data gathering occurred in two phases. 
In the first phase, primary data was collected via 
‘problem-centred qualitative interviews’ (PCIs) that 
were recorded with young Kyrgyzstani males and 
females. Furthermore, respondents were asked to 
fill in a short questionnaire on their general socio-
demographic situation, on particular aspects 
pertaining to the two thematic research pillars, 
and on their levels of knowledge about HIV/AIDS 
and sexually transmitted diseases (STD).
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In total, 350 PCIs were conducted among young 
males and females of Kyrgyz, Uzbek, Russian 
and other ethnic belonging. During the second 
phase of data gathering, focus group discussions 
(FGD) were organised with people who can be 
considered ‘relevant’ for youth (e.g. parents, 
school teachers, Islamic clerics). The FGDs were set 
up to capture the older generation’s perspective 
on contemporary Kyrgyzstani youth, as well as 
to access inter-generational viewpoints on the 
development of gender relations in regards to 
professional and A/SRH choices.
 Conceptually, this report takes inspiration 
from an approach called ‘opportunity structures’ 
(Merton 1995) in order to better grasp and present 
the primary data. This allows for analysis of the 
dynamics of how young Kyrgyzstanis assess, relate 
and negotiate potential life-chances in light of 
their particular socio-cultural, economic, local and 
contemporary historical embedding. From this 
emerges an in-depth understanding of the complex 
shaping and shifting of opportunity structures, 
as they are informed by young respondents’ 
belonging to collectives of (extended) family units, 
neighbourhood communities, ethnic and other 
peer groups.
 Research Outcomes and
 Cross-Cutting Perspectives
 The main research outcomes of the 
Youth Research are first discussed with regard to 
distinct ethnic groups of young male and female 
respondents: Kyrgyz, Uzbek, Russian and smaller 
minority groups (Tajiks, Turks and Kurds, Dungans, 
Uighurs).
 The section on young ethnic Kyrgyz 
illustrates that, for young women, the main 
consequence of how gender relations are 
perceived in their communities was that they have 
to continually negotiate their life trajectories. The 
term ‘turmush’ (life) is used to capture this blend 
of opportunities, challenges and setbacks that 
often meant that a woman’s future positioning 
in education, employment and marriage is not 
predetermined, but subject to change by personal 
initiative and by male counterparts who can in 
principle be persuaded to distance themselves 
from ‘traditional’ role perceptions. Therefore, the 
modus operandi for the Kyrgyz group could be 
summarised as a ‘pragmatic patriarchy’.
 In comparison to their Kyrgyz peers, young 
Uzbek men, and especially women, could be 
observed to enjoy less leverage when it came to 
negotiating their opportunities for education and 
employment vis-á-vis their parents, husbands, 
in-laws or within the Kyrgyz state. This could 
be captured with the Arabic term ‘sabr’, which 
depicts Islamic virtues of ‘endurance’, ‘patience’ 
and ‘perseverance’. ‘Sabr’ is important not only 
because young Uzbeks may be drawing more 
inspiration from Islam than their peers of different 
ethnic belonging, but also because of their 
disadvantaged status as ‘the other’ major ethnic 
group in southern Kyrgyzstan. Many young Uzbek 
women furthermore noted a mother’s patient 
(‘sabirli’) approach to life as the pre-eminent 
qualification for their role model, which also defines 
a rather observant and non-confrontational stance 
of waiting for incremental change to happen.
 The responses of Russian youth revealed 
that their coming of age occurs in quite different 
social settings compared to those of their ethnic 
Kyrgyz or Uzbek peers. Young Russian males 
and females did not mention patterns of co-
habitation within extended family groups, but 
rather reported a focus on the core-family unit 
of parents and a few siblings. In the case of most 
young Russian families both spouses worked 
and decision-making was considered an equally 
shared responsibility. Young Russian respondents 
framed a personal lifestyle of equal freedoms and 
female societal participation as being in sync with 
a ‘modern society’ (sovremennoye obshchestvo), 
for which the Soviet era’s Socialist ‘achievements’ 
in Central Asia served as the inspirational template.
Beyond that, Russian youth voiced their sense of 
being disadvantaged within a labour market in 
Kyrgyzstan that respondents often believed to 
feature aspects of nepotism, due to their ‘weaker’ 
social networks and their general lack of Kyrgyz 
language skills.
 The examination of smaller minority 
groups widened the spectrum of possible gender 
relations, and on the distribution of opportunities, 
in contemporary Kyrgyzstan. In regards to how 
youth’s social and cultural backgrounds related 
to perceptions of family, education, employment 
and other topics, the responses from the Tajik 
group revealed most similarities with those of 
their Uzbek peers. The insights provided by 
members of the Turkish and Kurdish communities, 
in comparison to those gained from other ethnic 
groups, illustrated severe limitations for females to 
participate in collective decision-making on their 
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education, marriage, employment and physical 
mobility. Among Dungan women, again, the 
importance of detailed location - i.e. inhabiting 
a ‘liberal’ or ‘traditional’ semi-urban environment 
in northern Kyrgyzstan - was notable in regards 
to their opportunities for influencing family 
matters or accessing education and employment 
opportunities. Finally, young male and female 
Uighurs presented educational achievements as 
highly important within their everyday life, which 
was also reflected in the fact that, unlike their 
Dungan peers, they were often prohibited by their 
parents to work alongside their school or even 
university studies.
 To account for the fact that young males 
and females in Kyrgyzstan share views, constraints 
and opportunities beyond their particular ethnic 
belonging, research outcomes are also presented 
from a cross-cutting perspective that aims to 
assess the varying degrees to which this could be 
observed. 
 Such a perspective is captured in the title 
chosen for the present report: ‘Displays of Patriarchy 
and Female Vigour’ is intended to express that 
many aspects of the everyday interactions between 
men and women in Kyrgyzstan tend to oscillate 
and are being negotiated in-between these two 
poles. Depending on ethnic belonging, but also 
on other parameters such as place of residence, 
a display of patriarchy may be rather rhetorical, 
while in fact female vigour is the actual shaping 
force of opportunities. Yet a display of patriarchy 
might equally be forceful, i.e. not only a matter of 
discourse, but strictly structuring the trajectories 
of families and female biographies. Then female 
vigour is still present and definitive, but may be 
concealed behind gendered performances of 
patience and perseverance (sabr).
 The cross-cutting perspective takes up the 
themes of language (and ethnicisation), location, 
violence, the flow of information and ‘being young’. 
 Russian respondents did not indicate 
that they are limited in their secondary or 
tertiary educational aspirations, but pointed to 
an ethnicised and nepotistic labour market that 
privileged their Kyrgyz peers. Young Uzbek males 
and females agreed with that observation, but 
also pointed to their native tongue’s decreasing 
functionality (in the educational and professional 
domain), even in the country’s southern areas 
where they enjoy a strong presence. Different 
geographic scales could be identified as playing 
a role in shaping youth opportunities, ranging 
from inter- to intra-regional differences and those 
between urban and rural areas. Examining these 
patterns, the ethnic groups inhabiting southern 
Kyrgyzstan could be identified as reflecting 
stronger displays of patriarchy that constrained 
female social and mobilities. 
 The responses of young Kyrgyzstanis of all 
ethnic groups demonstrated a pervasive exposure 
to violence and abuse of different sorts, from 
physical and emotional violence to verbal and 
financial abuse or neglect. At the same time, talking 
about violence largely remains a taboo, and violent 
acts can be seen as a performance of masculinity 
that is culturally legitimised by different audiences. 
 On a wide range of ‘delicate topics’, 
especially sexuality, barriers for cross-gender 
communication were reported to exist within 
families as well as between young males and 
females. The lack of first-hand experiences of the 
opposite gender could be identified as furthering 
stereotypes and speculation, such as a male 
distrust towards the ‘female character’. Aside 
from gender relations, young male and female 
respondents were also critical of parents and 
teachers who proved unmotivated or ill-informed 
to advise them on adequate choices for future 
professions (disregarding actual labour market 
demands and instead suggesting ‘prestigious’ 
study programmes).
 A patriarchal logic as well informed the 
functioning of the local ‘marriage market’, where 
the demand for future husbands dictated the 
terms for the supply of future wives, enforcing a 
gendered upbringing among young women of 
different ethnic groups that constrained them from 
equal pursuit of extracurricular activities outside 
their family home. Related to this was the older 
generation’s general scepticism that perceived 
adolescence not as an opportunity for someone 
to develop a responsible personality, but primarily 
as a period of easy descent into delinquency. 
Finally, displays of patriarchy concerned not only 
the unequal distribution of male and female 
responsibilities and opportunities, but also the 
unequal valuation of their respective contributions, 
regardless of whether these related to education, 
domestic work, child-rearing or employment.
Re
se
ar
ch
 o
n 
Pr
of
es
si
on
al
 a
nd
 M
ar
ria
ge
 C
ho
ic
es
 o
f Y
ou
th
 in
 K
yr
gy
zs
ta
n
16
Recommendations
Based on these research findings, the following 
recommendations are made:
	It is recommended to evaluate the 
curriculum of so-called ‘short-courses’, in 
which young women in particular were said 
to gain important practical skill-sets and thus 
future income opportunities, and identify 
potentials to promote these as alternative 
institutions of vocational training.
 It is recommended to support the 
improvement of information quality 
and distribution, regarding educational 
opportunities based on actual labour market 
demands.
 It is recommended to support the creation 
of ‘youth spaces’, which are characterised by 
horizontal relations and advance a mind-
set of ‘trust and responsibility’; and also to 
ensure in particular that young rural women 
have access to these.
 It is recommended to promote youth 
programmes that take into account the 
distinctive needs of recently married young 
couples who should be mobilised to serve 
as a peer-group resource for sharing 
experiences with the younger, unmarried 
generation.
 It is recommended to support the promotion 
of ‘young achievers’ as alternative role 
models, who originate from the same local 
communities and whose success is based on 
a positive utilisation of similar opportunity 
structures.
 It is recommended to promote the institution 
of ‘fatherhood’ in order to ensure a more 
active involvement of fathers in childrearing 
and social upbringing.
 It is recommended to promote those 
religious positions, which reflect gender-
awareness as an alternative moral source to 
denounce forms of discrimination against 
women and improve their opportunity 
structures in a culturally sensitive way.
 It is recommended to promote public 
debates about the physical, psychological 
and social repercussions of all forms of 
patriarchal abuse, to strengthen both 
collective responsibility and individual 
resilience to prevent these, and to enhance 
the readiness within communities to report 
and condemn acts of violent abuse.
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Research Design and 
Methodology
This section of the report presents the Youth Research’s main research design and methodology. It introduces key 
underlying questions and discusses the qualitative 
approach that has been followed to access young 
Kyrgyzstani’s lives and gender relations.
 The Youth Research is organised around 
the central research question ‘What key cultural, 
social, educational and economic factors 
negatively affect the empowerment of young 
women (aged 14 to 28) in Kyrgyzstan? What 
environment would be conducive to enabling 
their empowerment?’ The overall objective of 
the Youth Research is to establish comprehensive 
national level data in order to understand the 
existing Knowledge, prevailing Attitudes and 
actual Practices that lead to such structural and 
socially accepted discrimination of girls and 
young women in Kyrgyzstan. A KAP-based survey 
method allows for in-depth insights into local 
socio-cultural and politico-economic dynamics 
that shape the mutual relatedness of Kyrgyzstani 
young women and men. The insights from this 
study thus aim to provide a solid foundation for 
introducing workable, gender-sensitive legal and 
policy frameworks.
 The two major thematic pillars of research 
interest concerned (1) ‘Professional Choices of 
Girls and Young Women’ and (2) ‘Marriage and 
Adolescents’ Sexual and Reproductive Health 
(A/SRH) Choices’. In previous studies on youth 
in Kyrgyzstan, these topics have either remained 
entirely unaddressed or did not explicitly scrutinise 
gender distortions. In regard to professional 
choices, the questions posed to Kyrgyzstani youth 
concerned their future occupational aspirations 
and the ways in which they imagined achieving 
these, the issue of economic independence for 
women, and patterns of male and female social 
mobility. In regard to A/SRH choices, topics 
of interest related to marriage strategies and 
structures of gender in-/equality, as well as to 
levels of knowledge about A/SRH itself, and about 
different forms of violence (domestic and other).
 Data gathering occurred in two phases. 
In the first phase, primary data were collected via 
‘problem-centred qualitative interviews’ (PCIs) 
that were recorded with young Kyrgyzstani males 
and females. The instruments employed as part 
of the PCI were interview guides with a broad set 
of questions in order to induce a conversation, 
and the interviewer’s notes as part of a ‘field 
journal’, reflecting their approach and experiences 
during and after interviews. The PCIs generated 
qualitative data that did not aim at representativity, 
but which provide in-depth illustrations of young 
Kyrgyzstanis’ knowledge, attitudes and practices in 
regard to gender relations. 
 Furthermore, respondents were asked to 
fill in a short questionnaire with a standardised set 
of questions on their general socio-demographic 
situation and on particular aspects pertaining to 
the two thematic research pillars, as well as on 
their levels of knowledge about HIV/AIDS and 
sexually transmitted diseases (STD). As part of a 
mixed-methods approach, such quantifiable data 
allowed connections to be generated within the 
research sample, and so facilitated a comparison 
of various research findings through further 
analysis.
 Access to communities was achieved 
with official support, for example from local self-
government units, but was also facilitated by 
informal ‘gatekeepers’ who were willing to support 
the Youth Research’s objective. In total, 350 PCIs 
were conducted and respondents were identified 
according to purposeful random sampling. Of 
these respondents, 254 were young females and 
96 were young males. As regards age-cohorts, 119 
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respondents were between ages 14-17, 118 were 
between ages 18-23, and 113 were between ages 
24-28. In regard to ethnicity, most respondents, 
159 in total, were ethnic Kyrgyz. To represent the 
country’s two largest minorities, 67 young Uzbeks 
and 34 young Russians were interviewed. Finally, 
PCIs were also conducted with youth of smaller 
ethnic minority groups in Kyrgyzstan: Tajiks (29), 
Turks and Kurds (16), Dungans (11) and Uighurs 
(8).2 The exact distribution of respondents within 
these ethnic groups is indicated at the beginning 
of each sub-chapter in Part 4. 
 During a piloting phase, interview guides 
and questionnaires were tested for adequacy and 
validity, the sampling strategy was verified, and the 
interviewing skills of researchers were enhanced. 
Additional follow-up training and workshops for 
local researchers and analysts were conducted 
before all major research steps, in order to ensure 
capacity building. The data from the (transcribed) 
PCIs was processed and coded with the help of 
a computer software package (MaxQDA), which 
facilitated the first analysis and identification of 
significant response patterns.
 These insights initiated the second phase 
of data gathering. This occurred in focus group 
discussions (FGD) that assembled people who 
could be considered ‘relevant’ for young males 
and females, such as parents, school teachers, 
youth workers, Islamic clerics or heads of the local 
authorities. In total, nine FGDs were conducted, 
three among ethnic Kyrgyz, two each among ethnic 
Uzbeks and Russians, and one among ethnic Tajiks 
and Turks or Kurds. Each FGD evolved around a 
set of approximately ten questions and lasted 
for 60-90 minutes. Similarly to the procedure for 
the PCIs, after the FGDs participants were asked 
to fill in a short questionnaire, and moderators 
provided reflective notes on their experiences and 
impressions. 
 The FGDs were set up to capture the 
older generation’s perspective on contemporary 
Kyrgyzstani youth, as well as to access inter-
generational viewpoints on the development of 
gender relations in regard to professional and 
A/SRH choices. The exact questions raised for 
discussion in the focus groups were based on 
the insights of the first phase of data gathering. 
In that way, particular trends that were identified 
from the individual responses of young males and 
females of different ethnic groups, or in different 
locations, could then be critically elaborated within 
the context of responses from a larger audience. 
The FGDs were also transcribed and data used for 
software-based qualitative data analysis.
 The Youth Research adhered to the 
following ethical standards: Interviewees were 
informed about the aims and objectives of research 
and were given the opportunity to refuse to answer 
any specific question. Minors were interviewed 
only upon consent of one parent, and interviewers 
had been trained beforehand to pose questions 
in an age-appropriate manner. Interviewees could 
choose or switch to their preferred language 
during conversation (Kyrgyz, Russian, Uzbek). 
Confidentiality of interviewees was protected by 
a system of identification numbers, used in place 
names, and by publishing only composite cases 
(that were based on similar situations and other 
characteristics), rather than details of individual 
cases.
 Eventually, from the PCIs and the FGDs two 
separate but interlinked sets of qualitative data 
emerged that could be triangulated against each 
other. This final report draws on all data sources 
mentioned so far: interview transcripts of PCIs and 
FGDs, code structures recorded in the qualitative 
data software and questionnaire data. Furthermore, 
local analysts compiled ‘component reports’ that 
comprehensively outlined and discussed trends 
in gender perceptions among young females and 
males of each ethnic group.
2 26 additional respondents indicated belonging to other different minority groups that will not be discussed in this report.
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This part of the report presents the main outcomes of the Youth Research. Following a brief introduction of the conceptual framework 
that is used to support the description and analysis 
of the research data, the next sections will discuss 
gender perceptions and relations for each of the 
ethnic Kyrgyz, Uzbek, Russian and smaller minority 
groups (Tajiks, Turks and Kurds, Dungans, Uighurs). 
Finally, a cross-cutting perspective will be developed 
that identifies themes of significance for Kyrgyzstani 
youth, such as language, violence or the flow of 
information, regardless of their ethnic belonging. 
The footnotes of this section will also provide links 
to recent academic literature on youth and gender in 
Kyrgyzstan. As scientific knowledge on these topics 
is still scarce, especially on youth in rural areas, the 
empirical data collected as part of the Youth Research 
is a highly welcome contribution to on-going scientific 
debates.
 Conceptual Framework:
 Opportunity Structures
 In order to better grasp and present the data 
that has been gathered on the perceptions of gender 
relations in Kyrgyzstan, this report takes inspiration 
from the approach of ‘opportunity structures’. 
Originally introduced by sociologist Robert Merton 
(1995) as part of a theory of deviance, this approach 
assembles various elements of thought that are 
suitable for the analysis of the present topic. 
 First, the approach aims to investigate the link 
between the particular positioning of an individual 
within a social structure and the domain of ‘culture’, 
understood as local values or norms. This is to say 
that the distribution of, and the access to, various 
opportunities in a society tends to be significantly 
shaped by: 
(a) social categorisations such as age, gender, 
class or ethnic belonging; and
(b) what may be regarded as a culturally 
legitimate goal for someone to pursue.
As these configurations are commonly subject 
to (societal) negotiation, tensions might become 
apparent between various collective conventions 
and expressions of individual agency. In relation 
to the topic of this report, some of the debates in 
contemporary Kyrgyzstan revolve around questions 
such as: ‘Should a Kyrgyz girl attend university?’, ‘Can 
an Uzbek wife work after marriage?’, or ‘Who can be 
considered a good husband?’ 
 These topics are of crucial relevance for 
young Kyrgyzstanis today, and their responses allow 
for insights on how their particular embedding in 
communities of different orders (family, kinship, 
peer groups, neighbourhood) affect the present and 
future of their life-trajectories. While examining, for 
example, whether preconceived gender roles are 
complied with or questioned, this reveals that a gap 
might exist between the objective availability of an 
opportunity and the perception of whether seizing 
such an opportunity is considered appropriate or 
rational. An example would be the existence of an 
affordable school located close to a girl’s home, but 
where her parents are of the opinion that ‘girls do 
not need to attend school as they will be housewives 
and mothers’.
 Second, the ‘opportunity structures’ approach 
incorporates a notion of process, which means that 
one can examine the expansion or contraction of 
different life-chances for certain actors at various 
moments in time (Schröder 2010). Generally, this 
allows for changes in society to be tracked in relation 
to events of different kinds and magnitude, which 
in the Kyrgyzstani context might be the demise of 
the Soviet Union, the 2010 interethnic clashes in the 
country’s southern part, or the regional repercussions 
of Russia’s currently stagnant economy. 
 Recent trends that inform the ways in 
which young citizens of Kyrgyzstan perceive 
gender relations include: a growing significance of 
Islam in both the public sphere and private lives 
(as compared to the Soviet era); an emergence of 
ethnic nationalism that favours members of the 
country’s ‘titular nation’ (as opposed to a civic-based 
nationalism); and the relevance of labour migration, 
especially to Russia, for securing alternative incomes 
Research Outcomes
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(in light of Kyrgyzstan’s troubled national economy). 
Pressing questions arising from these developments 
are, for example: ‘Can a Kyrgyz girl who has lived and 
worked in Russia still be a good marriage partner?’; 
‘Is it logical not to send an Uzbek boy to university, 
because his chances of finding an ‘official job’ (within 
the country’s security forces, legislative or executive) 
are too slim?’; ‘How are the workplace relations 
of young Russians affected if they are unable to 
communicate in the Kyrgyz language?’ 
 On the one hand, these questions show 
that changes in opportunity structures are often 
related to re-localisations, meaning that geographic 
mobility (from a village to a city within Kyrgyzstan 
or to another country) might lead to social mobility 
(better education and/or income). On the other hand, 
the responses documented in this report illustrate 
that for young Kyrgyzstani women in particular the 
structuration of opportunities is not straightforward, 
and that pursuing one opportunity, such as 
education, might jeopardise attaining another one, 
such as a ‘happy family life’. As will be discussed in 
the following pages, such situations tend to emerge 
from the understanding that even within a family 
setting the opportunity for a female member is 
perceived as a definite loss for the male member(s). 
In such a male-dominated zero-sum-perception, 
the economic independence of a working woman is 
likely to motivate her to challenge the established 
patriarchal order of decision-making.
 Third, this report will examine all sorts of 
opportunities that Kyrgyzstani youth consider to 
be essential for their (future) lives. This means that 
next to the economic opportunities of generating 
income, there are further domains to consider, such 
as acquiring education or professional skills, gaining 
in prestige or fulfilling collective expectations, and 
being embedded in various social networks. This 
multi-dimensional perspective is inspired by Pierre 
Bourdieu’s (1986) classic idea that different ‘forms of 
capital’, ranging from the economic to the social, to 
the cultural and the symbolic, can be accumulated 
and converted by actors. 
 From this angle, it becomes apparent 
that young people’s opportunities are partially 
‘pre-structured’, depending, for example, on the 
educational and occupational status of their parents 
or on the location where they have grown up. 
Furthermore, seizing one and the same opportunity 
might be preparation for quite differently shaped 
futures, such as when the member of a less affluent 
rural household utilises her or his Russian language 
skills in order to become a labour migrant in Russia, 
while another young person might conduct his 
university studies in Russian in order to prepare 
for a white-collar professional career in Bishkek or 
another Kyrgyz city. At the same time, the viewpoints 
assembled in this report indicate that perceptions of 
what in fact constitutes an opportunity or not might 
differ significantly. Is the access to knowledge an 
unequivocally desirable state, or does, for example, 
the free flow of information on reproductive health 
actually ‘seduce’ young people to engage in sexual 
practices ‘too early’? In this regard, the report also 
reveals that the respondents’ positions on whether to 
conceive of new developments as either empowering, 
or as a threat to an established order, crucially depend 
on their own first-hand experiences. In consequence, 
the conviction that a working woman might 
pose a threat to familial stability is more strongly 
pronounced among those youths whose mothers 
have been housewives, instead of pursuing a career 
outside their own home.
 Fourth, the concept of opportunity structures 
is a probabilistic one and thus allows exploration of 
variations in degree instead of in kind. Accordingly, 
from one angle the present report will be able to 
investigate differences within the ethnic groups that 
are represented here, for example between those 
Kyrgyz males and females who reside in a certain 
region of the country, or in a village as opposed to 
an urban setting. From another angle, the report will 
examine variations across ethnic groups, such as the 
ways in which young females’ biographies and life-
choices are shaped by patriarchal practices and various 
forms of violence. When considering pathways into 
matrimony, for example, there are noticeable trends 
that: (1) within the Uzbek ethnic group marriages are 
arranged by parents, and the ability of future brides 
to impact on this decision-making is low; (2) for the 
Russian respondents, by contrast, it seems that the 
choice of a future partner is taken individually by the 
young woman herself; (3) among the ethnic Kyrgyz 
again, there are cases in-between these extreme 
poles, where the phenomenon of bride-kidnapping 
(ala kachuu) might either lead to involuntary 
marriage for young women, or be a welcome means 
(an ‘instrumentalised tradition’) to enforce a love-
marriage that is opposed by the parents.
 In summary, this report intends to utilise 
the concept of opportunity structures in order to 
analyse the dynamics of how young Kyrgyzstanis 
assess, relate and negotiate potential life-chances 
in light of their particular socio-cultural, economic, 
local and contemporary historical embedding. From 
this should emerge an understanding of the complex 
shaping and shifting of opportunity structures as 
they are informed by the respondents’ belonging to 
collectives of (extended) family units, neighbourhood 
communities, ethnic and other peer groups.
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 Turmush:
 How Young Kyrgyz Negotiate Life
 This section investigates the opportunity 
structures and perception of gender relations 
among young female and male respondents of the 
ethnic Kyrgyz group (who currently represent 73% 
of the country’s population). 3 The term ‘turmush’ 
(life) features in the headline, because it helps to 
illustrate key aspects of the perception that life 
may be full of challenges and setbacks, but that 
eventually it remains contingent and thus subject 
to change by personal initiative and negotiation, 
forging what could be called a ‘pragmatic 
patriarchy’.
 Following a brief account of the data 
source for this section of the report, the themes 
that will be explored among young Kyrgyz are 
‘Family Backgrounds’, ‘Professional Choices’ and 
‘Marriage and A/SRH Health Choices’.
 Data Source
 Data for this section were gathered in all 
administrative regions (oblasts) of Kyrgyzstan, 
plus the major cities of Osh and Bishkek. In total, 
159 interviews and three focus group discussions 
were conducted. Among the respondents were 
119 young females and 40 young males. Of the 
respondents, 104 were unmarried, 45 were married 
and nine were divorced. (One respondent provided 
no answer.) 
 The focus group discussions took place 
in At-Bashy village (Naryn oblast), Uchkorgon 
village (Batken oblast) and the city of Jalalabad 
(Jalalabad). Participants in these discussions were 
local community members who play a role in young 
people’s social upbringing and development, such 
as teachers, social workers, local government and 
law-enforcement officials or doctors.
 Family Backgrounds
 Social upbringing among the Kyrgyz is 
strongly gendered. For most young women this 
means that already from an early age they feel 
the need to negotiate with their parents what it 
means to be a ‘good daughter’. While defining 
this, the parents’ expectations that their daughters 
should primarily fulfil household chores are usually 
opposed to the girls’ aspirations to engage in 
extracurricular development or leisure activities. 
‘Unlike most of their male counterparts, it was in 
particular unmarried Kyrgyz young women from 
the rural and southern regions of the country, who 
stated to have only limited opportunities to spend 
time outside their family home so to avoid the 
social stigmatization of being considered ‘street 
girls’. Among parents there is a widespread anxiety 
that such a negative reputation later on could 
reduce their daughter’s ‘value’ in the marriage 
market later on, and thus the ability to secure an 
adequate husband. This situation was reported to 
be markedly different for youth in urban settings, 
where more attractive extracurricular opportunities 
are offered, where family budgets are bigger, 
and where there is less social control that would 
equally subordinate female mobility to a family’s 
reputation. Respondents accordingly remarked 
that in cities both genders are encouraged by their 
families to attend preparatory courses for university 
enrolment, music schools or sports clubs, and also 
that they may go out to discos or private parties.
3 See National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic (2016a).
Displays of Patriarchy and 
Female Vigour:
Observations on Kyrgyz, Uzbek, 
Russian and other Youth in Kyrgyzstan
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 The role models that Kyrgyz respondents 
commonly identified also follow a predominantly 
gendered perception of family and communal 
relations. Young women, for example, stated to 
admired how ‘patient and enduring’ (sabyrduu) 
or ‘hardworking’ their mothers were. Young men, 
by contrast, revered their fathers for ‘masculine’ 
traits, such as ‘assertiveness’, ‘dominance’ or 
‘family leadership’.
 The picture of unequivocally gendered 
hierarchies became more complex once the 
respondents reflected on the actual processes 
of decision-making in their families. Although 
most Kyrgyz youth did not question that the 
final decision would rest with the eldest male, 
many also remarked that matters of particular 
significance would first be discussed in a family 
council. This informal institution often includes 
both parents and other older family members 
who would share their opinions on an equal 
basis. When it came to particular family expenses, 
women were said to more often decide in domains 
of health care, children’s education and other 
small everyday matters, whereas decisions about 
larger investments, such as a car, an apartment or 
a washing machine, were attributed to men. In the 
few cases where mothers were identified as the 
main family decision-makers, this was related to 
their proportionally large financial contributions 
to the family budget due to their status as working 
women.
 Respondents from the southern oblasts 
of Batken, Osh and Jalalabad tended to name 
fathers, brothers or other male family members as 
the family’s main breadwinner, regardless of their 
actual income status. In line with this regional 
pattern, even working wives from the south of the 
country tended to undervalue their own financial 
contributions to the family budget, referring to the 
inferiority of ‘grace and bliss’ bestowed on female 
earnings. Rather, it was regarded as a matter of 
‘honour’, but not necessarily of fact, to nominate 
males as both the head of the family and the main 
breadwinner. 
 In marked contrast to this, a focus group 
discussion in the northern oblast of Naryn 
presented rather favourable views on ‘housemen’, 
which has been a recent development, owing 
largely to the structural economic decline in 
this remote area. With shrinking employment 
opportunities in the industrial sector and 
commercial agriculture, fathers were reported 
to be taking over more household chores, such 
as preparing daily meals or caring for children. 
Wives, on the other hand, are encouraged by 
their husbands and in-laws to generate income, 
because what scarce employment opportunities 
there are in Naryn can usually be found in female-
dominated places of employment such as schools, 
hospitals or the local self-government bodies.
 Professional Choices:
 Education and Occupation
 Most Kyrgyz respondents reflected a 
positive attitude towards their school, which 
they described as their ‘second home’. Especially 
appreciated was the school ‘community’ of 
directors, teachers and classmates and often also 
the school facilities, ranging from the sports hall to 
musical instruments. Generally, students expressed 
satisfaction with the education they had received. 
However, it was remarked that there was a lack of 
specialist knowledge and that the ‘psychological 
preparation’ of young people was insufficient in 
order for them to be able to make an informed 
choice about their future professions.
 A majority of Kyrgyz respondents of 
both genders, from both rural and urban areas, 
declared that they had been employed during 
their school years. Some began working from 5th 
grade onwards, i.e. 11-12 years of age, mostly 
during weekends or vacations. Some indicated the 
necessity to earn money in order to supplement 
their family’s budget, for example to buy school 
uniforms or supplies. Others expressed a wish to 
earn extra money for their personal needs and 
to gain work experience. Rural male respondents 
reported that they organised themselves into 
groups and sought employment as day-labourers 
in the agricultural sector or on construction sites. 
Female respondents from rural areas commonly 
assisted with their family’s business or farm, 
whereas their urban peers mostly worked as 
waiters, dishwashers or receptionists. Urban 
male respondents also found employment in 
the service sector as waiters, in car washes or as 
bazaar-sellers.
 Student respondents revealed serious 
frustrations with the post-secondary education 
system, which were caused primarily by pervasive 
corruption, low quality of teaching, and poor 
facilities and equipment at local universities. In 
fact, quite a lot of Kyrgyz youth questioned the 
legitimacy of tuition fees in light of the fact that 
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they were also forced to pay multiple bribes each 
semester for what is essentially unsatisfactory 
teaching. This situation notwithstanding, post-
secondary education is understood by the 
prevailing majority of young Kyrgyz as the most 
promising way to secure a decent livelihood. 
Regardless of gender, the respondents showed 
an awareness of the necessity to obtain further 
professional qualifications, either in vocational 
schools or at universities. 
 Despite this encompassing notion of 
continuing education, the research data showed 
that young females face a wide range of barriers 
or threats to pursuing their academic aspirations. 
Among these are: entry into marriage, domestic 
responsibilities of young married women and 
absence of support from parents and spouses. 
Furthermore, in cases of financial hardship families 
tend to prefer to invest scarce resources in the 
education of male siblings. As the following quote 
from a young female illustrates, women might then 
decide to subordinate their individual ambitions in 
order to avoid becoming a burden to their birth 
family:
‘I was actually planning to study. By that time, 
both my sister and brother were at university. 
We had only my mother and I did not want 
to cause her into more hardship. Both of my 
siblings had to pay tuition fees, and imagine 
that if I went to university it would have been a 
disaster. So I decided to get married.’
 As regards enrolment into a particular 
university and the ability to select their faculty, in 
Kyrgyzstan much depends on a pupil’s performance 
scores in the annual ‘All-Republican Testing’ 
(ORT) or National University Admissions Test. 
In comparison to their urban peers, prospective 
students from rural areas of the country often face 
structural disadvantages. Without similar financial 
means, parental support and free time to attend 
the respective preparatory courses, or participate 
in other skill-building activities, their actual 
educational choices often do not relate to the future 
profession they had envisioned. For young Kyrgyz 
women, this matter is further complicated by the 
question of what can be considered an acceptable 
female occupation. Parents often recommend 
that their daughters become teachers, medical 
professionals, hairdressers or tailors, because 
these professions would be in permanent demand 
in both urban and rural areas, and are also flexible 
in regard to managing workloads and hours. These 
professions are thus regarded as ‘proper for girls’, 
mainly due to the fact that they do least to interfere 
with duties of child-rearing, household chores or the 
professional orientation and place of employment 
of a future husband. Accordingly, running a private 
business was found by many to be inappropriate 
for women, as it might be too time-intensive. Such 
subordination of female careers is also evidenced 
by the fact that alternative trajectories are often 
strongly discouraged by parents, who argue that 
these could threaten future family life. One female 
respondent, for example, who wanted to become a 
singer, reported that her parents and other relatives 
continuously challenged her dream, arguing that 
‘singers are unhappy in family’ or ‘singing is not 
decent for a girl’.
 The perception of ‘working women’ was 
found to differ significantly between the southern 
and northern parts of Kyrgyzstan. A vast majority 
in the southern oblasts were opposed to female 
employment, arguing that ‘a woman’s place is in 
the home’, ‘a woman’s duty is to rear children’, or 
‘it is the man who should go out and make money, 
not the woman’. In contrast, most of those male 
respondents in the northern oblasts of Naryn, 
Issyk-Kul, and partially in Talas, whose own mothers 
had higher education and were working, claimed 
to support their wives’ and daughters’ decisions to 
do so as well. This perspective is reflected in the 
following quote of a young 17-year-old man from 
Naryn:
‘Women should work. You need to feed the 
children. If you [a woman] do not work, from 
where should you take food? For example, if you 
just stay at home and do the household chores, 
there is no money coming out of it…By working 
they should feed the children.’
 Yet, employed women who contribute to 
the family budget were also commonly expected 
to keep up with their regular household duties. 
When such balancing efforts proved difficult, for 
example due to a lack of spousal or other family 
members’ support, women often felt pressured to 
prioritise domestic life over their careers, in order 
to avoid family tensions and blame. Some women 
also found themselves feeling guilty for not being 
able to cope with such a double burden:
‘This is one of the complicated situations, when 
it is difficult to make a decision…Maybe if the 
matter came to this, she might be guilty herself, 
too, because she could not manage her time 
well. But on the other hand women are not 
some kind of engine, which will always work like 
a robot. She gets tired “morally”…There is a need 
to find a compromise, that is for sure.’
 Only in exceptional cases is the income of 
married women not reported to and controlled by 
their husbands or in-laws (often the mother-in law)
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if they live in the same household. What females 
earn was usually spent on the family’s everyday 
needs such as food, clothes, and toys for children 
or school supplies. Such practices were justified 
as ‘being respectful’ towards husbands or in-laws, 
and there was also the view that a female’s income 
is less ‘blessed’ than that of a male.
 In addition, many Kyrgyz respondents 
shared the belief that, following her economic 
independence, a woman might seek stronger 
participation in decision-making and thus 
challenge the established patriarchal family 
constellations. Male respondents emphasised that 
such a development could increase the risk of 
divorce. The following quote gives a female Kyrgyz 
respondent’s reflection on how a man’s peer group 
might perceive a working wife as undermining his 
masculinity: 
‘For example, my husband’s friends may say: 
“What’s wrong with your wife? Can you not 
manage her since she earns? Did she become so 
strong?” Such situations can occur.’
Following female perceptions of their professional 
opportunities over time revealed that even in 
the northern regions of Kyrgyzstan, which are 
considered less ‘traditional’, there are few women 
who had not been forced to significantly downgrade 
their earlier ambitions. While adolescent girls still 
imagined becoming highly qualified experts, who 
will work in management positions and sponsor 
charity projects on the side, among the next 
generation of married mothers most hoped to 
return to previous employment, and admitted that 
they would not reach what they had envisioned for 
their professional future by their 30s. In contrast, 
marriage could not be observed to mark a similarly 
(negative) turning point for the social mobility 
patterns of young men.
 In light of Kyrgyzstan’s weak national 
economy, labour migration to Russia has become 
an attractive opportunity for many to improve 
their livelihoods. In regard to gender perceptions, 
the issue of women migrating and living abroad 
for a prolonged time has remained a controversial 
one. Whereas for young men, leaving home to find 
employment elsewhere was generally considered 
a legitimate opportunity, female geographic 
mobility, especially of unmarried young women, 
was primarily perceived as a threat to their 
physical safety, moral integrity and personal 
health, and thus to their future potential for being 
regarded as a good wife. Especially in cases, 
however, when the earning potential for Kyrgyz 
women from migration exceeds that of their male 
counterparts, such an opportunity is difficult to 
ignore for families caught in precarious situations, 
while at the same time it challenges ‘traditional’ 
delineations between breadwinning outside the 
home and the domestic sphere.
 The case study of Ainura, a 24-year-
old Kyrgyz woman from the city of Jalalabad, 
serves well to illustrate potential causes and 
also consequences of migration when examined 
through the prism of gender relations:
When she was a 4th year university student 
Ainura started to work in a local bank in order 
to contribute to her tuition fees. Following the 
death of her father some years previously, the 
family became burdened by financial problems, 
and the money that Ainura earned in the bank 
was not enough anymore to contribute to her 
family’s expenses. So Ainura decided on labour 
migration to Russia, from where she then sent 
home money and even managed to finish her 
studies (as an external student of a Kyrgyz 
university). Still, Ainura remarked that she used 
to be confronted with typical stereotypes, even 
from among her own relatives, about how her 
time abroad might have left a negative imprint: 
‘What I do not like is, if you went to Russia, 
everyone thinks you are a bad girl. So I do not 
like those who think like that…As I was saying, 
some people think: “You have been to Russia, 
probably you smoke or do other things?” They 
have bad thoughts.’
 At the time of the interview Ainura was still 
unmarried.
 However, she did not elaborate on whether 
this was because she would fall into the category 
of ‘a girl who has seen Russia’, which tends to 
raise doubts among future in-laws as to whether a 
female migrant might not be too independent and 
too strong-willed for a marriage to succeed.
 Such a view is exemplified in the following 
quote by another respondent:
‘Now, for example, as far as I know, after a trip 
to Russia, it is pretty hard to marry for girls…
Because there are rumours that she married 
in Russia, or she met someone there. We have 
not seen this, but there are rumours which 
spread in the village…and then for example, 
after becoming daughter-in-law of someone, 
if someone finds any improper behaviour or 
hears a bad word from her, then immediately 
they say: “this is the girl who visited Russia”…
Maybe she has behaved well there in Russia, 
but people will still say she has seen other 
places, other people, etc. Therefore, for young 
women it is difficult, it would be better if they 
did not go.’
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 The voices of Kyrgyz parents during focus 
group discussions revealed serious contemplations 
about the futures of their daughters. Aside from 
early ‘unprepared’ marriages and migration to 
Russia, parents revealed that they seek alternatives, 
which would keep daughters local, but also 
enhance their future income opportunities. In line 
with this, as early as during their secondary school 
years, Kyrgyz girls in the Batken or Jalalabad areas 
are reportedly sent on courses that improve 
practical skill-sets such as cooking or sewing. 
During marriage, being able to sew clothes for 
children or bake homemade pastries could mean 
making actual contributions to the family budget. 
These skills are understood to be in demand 
within the tertiary economic sector, enabling 
young women to draw additional income from 
selling such homemade goods.
 Furthermore, according to focus 
group respondents, more and more families 
in Kyrgyzstan’s southern and rural areas see a 
necessity to equip their daughters with higher 
education at local university branches before 
they enter marriage. Enrolling through the ORT 
system into institutes close-by, such as in the 
towns of Kizilkiya or Batken, has come to be 
perceived as an opportunity for young women 
of low- or medium-income families to access 
free undergraduate programmes. The rationale 
behind such investments into daughters’ skill-
sets is not only that they will be less dependent 
on their husbands’ or in-laws’ benevolence, but 
also that they will be better able to cope in case of 
divorce, which is seen as a realistic possibility. As 
one mother put it:
‘We don’t know how her [the daughter’s] life will 
look like after she gets married. Hopefully, she 
will have a caring husband and children. But 
who knows, maybe she gets divorced one day 
and will be left alone with her children. Then she 
will be forced to go working in order to provide 
for her family. Without education she will be 
easily lost.’
 However, in cases, where men accept that 
current conditions favour income opportunities 
for women over them, especially in rural areas of 
Kyrgyzstan, then a pragmatic approach to sharing 
household chores may ensure family well-being. 
Such a trend of ‘housemen’ or ‘husbands at the 
stove’ was discussed during a focus group in Naryn. 
The words of Aisalkyn, a 38-year old working 
mother of five children, give insight into how her 
unemployed husband overcame constraining 
notions of patriarchal pride: 
‘A woman with children, who works at school 
all day long, comes home in the evening and 
takes no rest, because of remaining household 
chores. It is extremely tiring! My husband does 
not work. He stays at home, but helps me a lot. 
By now he seems to understand me better, I 
guess. Sometimes I even ask him to fry potatoes 
for dinner or something easier…In fact, he 
does not feel ashamed of doing housework. In 
the beginning, he used to feel uncomfortable 
because my mother-in-law kept telling him that 
he was obeying me and doing a woman’s work. 
Now he seems to have changed his mind. He 
does not mind doing the housework for me. We 
are both very much content about this.’
 At the same time, Aisalkyn’s further remarks 
indicated that this was still a delicate balance that 
needed empathy and careful attention. To gloss 
over her husband’s feelings of economic inferiority, 
Aisalkyn tended to exaggerate the impact of his 
modest earnings:
‘Sometimes I really have to tell a lie to him. I 
tell him: “Look how much I could buy from your 
3000 soms [$44]. A man’s earnings are indeed 
blessed and bountiful (berekeluu)!”’
 Marriage and A/SRH
 Health Choices
 Many of the Kyrgyz respondents indicated 
that 25 years is the age by which a woman should 
get married. Women beyond that threshold 
were said to face social stigmatisation and were 
perceived to lose value within the ‘marriage 
market’. For men, the latest age to marry was often 
considered to be 30 years, although some female 
respondents expressed the view that a man does 
not actually have an age-limit for marriage. 
 For a young Kyrgyz woman, marriage 
entails leaving her birth family and joining her 
husband’s household, which in most cases results 
in sharing the living space, for some time at 
least, with his parents, siblings or other relatives. 
The position of a ‘daughter-in-law’ (kelin) in the 
husband’s family was generally experienced as 
one of vulnerability, which was burdened with the 
need to prove one’s versatility as a ‘good wife’. 
For many young Kyrgyz men, this means their 
wife fulfilling various household chores and being 
obedient, caring and submissive. Female Kyrgyz 
respondents revealed that they were aware, or 
had already experienced themselves, that various 
forms of violence are likely to be a part of such 
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married life. Expectations for a partner were thus 
mainly framed in the absence of negative traits, 
and many considered that a decent husband is 
someone who ‘does not drink’, ‘does not smoke’ 
and ‘does not beat’.
 The following case study illustrates the 
violent predicaments that young Kyrgyz women 
may have to face, in particular if a forced marriage 
by bride-kidnapping is followed by continuous 
experience of domestic violence:
Jyldyz (24) is divorced and has two daughters 
from her earlier marriage. At the age of 17 she 
was kidnapped while she was still studying in 
the 11th grade. Since then she has not pursued 
further education. She left her husband, who 
is troubled with an excessive alcohol problem, 
three times after repeatedly having suffered 
from severe physical and psychological abuse. 
She reported that the abuse also took place 
when she was pregnant with her children. This 
time she left the house early in the morning after 
not sleeping the whole night. Jyldyz thought 
that she would not survive the night before. Her 
husband threatened to kill her by putting a knife 
to her neck, beat her with his bare hands, threw 
kitchen appliances at her and verbally abused 
her.
The first time Jyldyz returned to her mother’s 
house, her mother believed her story only after 
having seen the bruises that Jyldyz had sustained 
from the domestic violence. After some time, 
Jyldyz’s husband begged her to return and 
promised he would not beat her again. Jyldyz 
did not believe him but still returned after 
hearing what her mother told her: ‘Go back 
[to the husband] and live with him. This is life 
[turmush]. Your father also used to beat me. We 
have been living like this for many years’. Upon 
Jyldyz’s return, her husband continued drinking 
and violently retaliated against her for putting 
him into a degrading position in front of her 
mother.
As she did not receive support from her mother, 
this time Jyldyz came to live with her brother, who 
showed understanding and support. The brother 
registered Jyldyz’s children in a kindergarten 
and she is currently looking for a job.
 Beyond the actual experience of physical 
violence, this case allows the identification of 
further aspects that are essential for understanding 
how Jyldyz or other young Kyrgyz women might 
end up in a situation where opportunities are 
extremely limited. This begins with the cultural 
legitimisation of bride-kidnapping as a ‘Kyrgyz 
tradition’. A high number of respondents from the 
rural areas of Kyrgyzstan reported being aware of 
relatives or friends who either had participated in 
a kidnapping, or had been kidnapped themselves. 
Bride-kidnapping also appeared to be among the 
prime causes of early marriage, and some girls had 
reportedly already been kidnapped at 16 years 
of age. While the general perception of bride-
kidnapping among respondents was negative, 
many still did not perceive of it as a criminal act 
(amounting to deprivation of liberty).
 In the case of a kidnapping, parents often 
felt obliged to subordinate their daughter’s 
individual objection to such a marriage to the 
collective power of gossip and the threat this might 
pose for a family’s reputation, especially within 
smaller village communities (‘elder emne deit?’ - 
‘what will people say?’). As the case above vividly 
shows, the social anxiety associated with ‘having 
to take a daughter back’ may be strong enough 
to lead to the rejection of desperate requests for 
help, regardless even of a mother’s own history of 
suffering from violence (as in the case of Jyldyz’s 
mother).4
 Such a situation is further exacerbated 
by the fact that some of the female respondents 
expressed support for violent means of disciplining, 
for example when a wife ‘talks too much’ or does 
not ‘care for the children properly’. Without in 
any way justifying the violence exerted by male 
perpetrators, this shows that the perpetuation of 
(violent) patriarchal practices relies also on the 
complicity of women, be these mothers who force 
their daughters to remain in an abusive marriage, 
or mothers-in-law who protect their violent sons. 
Young Kyrgyz women frequently identified their 
mothers-in-law as a general source of tension 
in their everyday lives, which went beyond them 
being criticised for a lack of household skills or 
efforts in childrearing.
 In summary, Kyrgyz women who seek an exit 
from an abusive or otherwise unhappy marriage 
face multiple cultural and social barriers. Pointing 
to the ‘shame’ that a divorce would bring to their 
birth families, and also concluding that one should 
endure domestic violence as part of life (turmush), 
has established a strong social taboo that silences 
women. In consequence, women who choose 
to resist tend to receive little support from their 
own parents, other family members or the law-
enforcement agencies (who are not considered 
as trustworthy sources willing to protect them). 
Women who have been bride-kidnapped could 
be said to suffer most from this situation, because 
they are often regarded as only ‘2nd class wives’, 
and thus are more prone to being physically and 
psychologically abused and neglected.
4Certainly, in cases of precarious livelihoods the ‘cultural argument’ might only serve as a front, while in fact parents might be motivated to oppose 
their daughter’s return because their family budget would hardly allow them to feed any additional members.
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 As regards puberty and sexual reproductive 
health, respondents indicated using different 
sources of knowledge. For example, a majority of 
female respondents from Osh and Jalalabad, and 
some from Talas and Naryn, reported that they had 
attended meetings organised by the local women’s 
councils at their schools. Young participants 
remarked, however, that these gatherings would 
focus less on providing actual information about 
A/SRH Health Choices, but rather pressured girls 
to abstain from pre-marital sexual intercourse, 
referring to the moral discourse on the supreme 
value of female virginity:
‘The women’s council tells stories about one girl 
from this class who got married to this boy. They 
scold us like: “Are you cattle to lay down?! You 
also want to sleep on the white sheet, marry 
with a white dress [indicating virginity].”’
 In fact, this quote reflects a more general 
pattern that predominantly assigned the 
responsibility for reproductive and sexual choices 
to women. When discussing pregnancies out 
of wedlock, which respondents identified as a 
widespread phenomenon, it was almost exclusively 
women who were blamed for not thinking to 
‘save’ their virginity for their future husbands. 
Accordingly, unmarried pregnant women were 
often left alone to face the consequences, which 
may be a forced marriage, single parenthood, 
clandestine abortion, or relocation to another 
village/city where the child will be born in secret 
and then left with grandparents.
 Those female respondents who would 
openly discuss puberty and sexuality with their 
mothers originated from the urban areas of Bishkek 
and Osh. Young women from rural areas expressed 
a preference for talking about such topics with other 
female members of their extended family, such as 
aunts, sisters and sisters-in-law. Male respondents, 
by contrast, claimed that they would not talk about 
puberty and sexuality with their fathers or other 
male relatives, but rather mentioned the Internet, 
friends or older boys in their neighbourhood as 
sources of information on these matters.
 The opportunity to educate youth on A/SRH 
Health Choices at school was a controversial topic. 
Although a majority of respondents were in favour 
of spreading information on the consequences 
of unprotected sex and similar topics, there were 
also members of local communities, mostly men 
and those with a religious background, who were 
anxious that this might provoke promiscuous 
behaviour among youth (which furthermore was 
seen as a negative influence emanating from 
‘Western’ societies). The following is a voice from a 
focus group discussion held in the Talasoblast:
‘I think it is better if such classes do not take 
place. For example, when a teacher explains 
it, it may push young people to do it. A person 
may not follow all desires, but this desire 
may not be temporarily left alone. Therefore, 
after hearing everything in class, a girl and a 
boy want to do it and they may get engaged 
in a sexual relationship. This is why I think 
it is not appropriate to give classes about the 
relationships between girls and boys and sexual 
contact. Better live peacefully [sic!].’
 Discussion
 The insights presented in the preceding 
paragraphs on gender perceptions and 
opportunity structures of young male and female 
Kyrgyz established a baseline and a range of 
themes, which from here on will also be discussed 
and expanded in reference to the ethnic minority 
groups of Kyrgyzstan. The following paragraph 
will highlight some of the most salient trends and 
aspects.
 While growing up, most of the young 
Kyrgyz female respondents were exposed to a 
gendered upbringing that juxtaposes a domestic-
female with an outside-male domain. In line with 
that, unmarried Kyrgyz women were subject to 
parental control, whereby parents, acting out of 
fear for the family’s reputation, tended to constrain 
their daughters’ participation in extracurricular 
academic or leisure activities outside of her own 
home. However, for Kyrgyz girls there appeared 
to exist the opportunity to actively negotiate this 
private-public balance within their families, i.e. 
the boundaries of what it meant to be ‘a good 
daughter’. This opportunity could be understood 
to exist (1) more for Kyrgyz girls in the northern 
parts of the country than in the south; and (2) for 
Kyrgyz girls rather than, for example, their Uzbek, 
Tajik or Kurdish peers.
 The primary orientation for these 
negotiations remained a young women’s value 
in the ‘marriage market’. In practice, the idealised 
requirements of future in-laws demanded from 
daughters-in-law that they walk a thin line between 
being educated, but not too old; and between 
being employable, but ready to prioritise husband 
and children. On the one hand, this equipped 
quite a lot of young Kyrgyz women with the 
prospect of becoming relevant decision-makers 
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and active participants in societal life. Aside from 
higher education, a recent trend in this regard was 
notable in southern Kyrgyzstan, where parents 
sent their daughters on so-called ‘short courses’ 
in order for them to develop skills such as cooking 
or sewing, which they could capitalise on in the 
future (as wives or single parents).
 On the other hand, multiple patriarchal 
barriers could be detected that young women 
were facing. Within the marriage market, 
female expectations for a male spouse were set 
significantly lower than vice versa, and it was 
common for someone to be perceived as a decent 
husband simply if he ‘does not drink’, ‘does not 
smoke’ and ‘does not beat’. As regards education 
and employment, the lack of spousal support, 
or the previous preferential treatment of male 
siblings by parents, forced many young Kyrgyz 
women to diverge from their original career 
aspirations (turning towards more ‘female’ jobs 
or becoming housewives). Many Kyrgyz male 
respondents revealed that they do not trust the 
‘female character’, which, it was believed, could 
lead working women in particular to demand 
more participation in decision-making and thus 
challenge patriarchal family constellations. Within 
all-male peer-groups such scepticism appeared to 
be reinforced, which advances an understanding 
of gender relations not as potential accumulative 
advantage, but as a zero-sum game viz. ‘what the 
woman will win, the man will lose’.
 Kyrgyz women continued to suffer from 
violence against them, be that forced marriage 
through bride-kidnapping, or domestic violence 
and other abuses during marriage. In regard to 
bride-kidnapping, it is interesting to note that 
although a daughter’s divorce was understood 
to bring ‘shame’ (uyat) upon the family as well, 
for many parents this negative prospect wasn’t 
sufficient to prevent an involuntary early marriage 
of their daughter in the first place, or to respond 
to her call for protection. The complicity of 
older women, such as mothers who forced their 
daughters to stay in an abusive marriage, or 
mothers-in-law who protected their violent sons, 
could be identified as contributing significantly 
to the perpetuation of patriarchal practices and 
the silencing of women. Furthermore, and aside 
from the elder generation’s general suspicion that 
information on the topic of reproductive and sexual 
choices would instigate youth’s promiscuity, the 
responsibility to prevent and handle matters such 
as non-marital pregnancies was predominantly 
assigned to women.
 The previous paragraphs have illustrated 
that for young women in Kyrgyzstan the main 
consequence from how gender relations 
are perceived in their communities was to 
continue negotiating their life trajectories. The 
term ‘turmush’ (life) captures this blending of 
opportunities, challenges and setbacks that often 
seemed to render a woman’s future positioning 
in education, employment and marriage as not 
predestined but as subject to change by personal 
initiative and male counterparts who can, in 
principle, be persuaded to reassess traditional 
norms. Essentially, the modus operandi for the 
Kyrgyz group could be summarised as a ‘pragmatic 
patriarchy’. It was best exemplified by the 
‘housemen’ of Naryn, who proved flexible enough 
to distance themselves from their traditionally 
assigned roles as family patriarchs, in the light 
of inescapable material circumstances which 
favoured female employment opportunities, and 
in the interests of the well-being of their families.
 Sabr: The Relevance of     
        Endurance among Uzbek Youth
 The following section will examine the 
opportunity structures and understanding of 
gender relations among young female and male 
respondents of the ethnic Uzbek group. Nation-
wide, the Uzbeks represent 14.6% of Kyrgyzstan’s 
population.5 More relevant, however, is their strong 
presence in the country’s southern regions (Batken 
oblast, Jalalabad oblast, Osh oblast and city) 
where the Uzbek population is 26.6%.6 The Arabic 
term ‘sabr’, which encapsulates the Islamic virtues 
of ‘endurance’, ‘patience’ and ‘perseverance’, was 
chosen as the headline for this section, because it 
successfully captures the essential aspects of how 
everyday life is perceived and imagined among 
the largest ethnic minority of Kyrgyzstan.
 Following a brief comment on the data 
source for this section of the report, the themes 
that will be explored among young Uzbeks are 
‘Family Backgrounds’, ‘Professional Choices’ and 
‘Marriage and A/SRH Health Choices’.
5 See National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic (2016a).
6 See National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic (2016b).
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 Data Source
 Data for this section were gathered almost 
exclusively in Kyrgyzstan’s southern regions of Osh, 
Jalalabad and Batken. In total, 67 interviews were 
conducted, among them 45 with young females 
and 22 with young males. 42 of the respondents 
were unmarried, 20 were married and four were 
divorced. (One respondent provided no answer.) 
 Two focus group discussions took place in 
the city of Osh. Participants in these discussions 
were members of local communities, including 
local (Islamic) clerics and women of neighbourhood 
communities (‘mahalla’).
 Family Backgrounds
 During the interviews for this report, many 
of the young Uzbek respondents were hesitant 
to discuss what they considered ‘private’ matters 
regarding their family backgrounds or ‘delicate’ 
topics, such as ethnic discrimination. This state 
of suspicion and anxious vulnerability dates 
back to the 2010 interethnic conflict in southern 
Kyrgyzstan, when a majority of casualties, but later 
also of defendants and victims of detention or ill-
treatment,were ethnic Uzbeks. 
 The basic patterns of gendered 
socialisation and patriarchal family hierarchies that 
young Uzbeks reported having experienced were 
comparable to those just depicted for the ethnic 
Kyrgyz of the southern region. From here on, the 
task of this section will be to examine the different 
degrees of manifestation, and the particular 
consequences these entailed, for male and female 
Uzbek respondents.
 Among Uzbek females of all age groups, 
mothers served as the primary role model. 
Respondents spoke with deep appreciation about 
how their mothers as guides helped them to 
reach their maximum potential for housekeeping, 
childrearing, overcoming difficulties in life and 
displaying proper behaviour within the local 
community. The following quote exemplifies 
this:
‘My mother is a very patient [sabrli] woman. She 
has faced many difficulties, but despite these 
she has always been patient. Many people who 
face difficulties become nervous and aggressive 
towards other people, but my mother, unlike 
these kinds of people, is patient, friendly and 
forgiving. Thus, I try to imitate her and my ideal 
is my mother.’
Furthermore, quite in contrast to the other ethnic 
groups discussed in this report, those Uzbek 
respondents who identified themselves as being 
religious believers noted that their ethical and 
moral values, including the question of how to be 
‘an ideal woman’, were inspired by the life of the 
‘Holy Prophet’ Muhammad: 
‘As we are from a religious family and wear the 
hijab, we try to be like the Prophet’s wives. We 
want to be as cultured and educated as they 
were. They once distinguished themselves as 
ideal women and were very educated. That is 
why I admire them and try to be like them.’
 Professional Choices:
 Education and Occupation
 Uzbek respondents generally drew a 
favourable picture of schooling, in part because 
secondary education is offered in their mother 
tongue. On the other hand, graduates of such 
Uzbek-language schools later on may face limited 
opportunities in regard to their continuing 
education, especially as, since 2013, the nationwide 
university entry exam (ORT) can be taken only 
in the country’s ‘state language’ (Kyrgyz) or the 
‘official language’ (Russian). Therefore, if a young 
Uzbek is not proficient enough in one of these 
additional languages, access to universities 
and further professional opportunities, such as 
employment in the public sector, are significantly 
limited.
 Young Uzbek men, similarly to their 
Kyrgyz peers, aimed to work during their school 
vacations, earning money from construction 
work, washing cars, helping out in the fields, or 
from selling fruits and home-made drinks. Female 
Uzbek respondents indicated contributing to the 
family budget by working in local bazaars, tutoring 
children, babysitting, or preparing baked goods to 
be sold. 
 Some female Uzbek respondents indicated 
tensions at school because of their preference to 
wear the ‘hijab’ (Islamic headscarf). As the following 
quote from a 15-year-old female resident of Osh 
illustrates, confrontations emerged when the 
school personnel questioned a pupil’s ability to 
progress academically on grounds of her religious 
appearance: 
‘There are a lot of girls at school who wear 
the hijab. In fact, the director has no right to 
prohibit wearing the hijab, as the president 
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[of Kyrgyzstan] permits it. But she does not like 
it. Every time when she demands that I take 
my hijab off, I say to her that the president has 
permitted it. She behaves towards covered girls 
as if they are backwards. She does not want to 
hear my opinion. The hijab is just the hijab. I 
am keen on learning secular sciences such as 
physics, chemistry and biology. I told her: “I will 
surpass your uncovered students and enter the 
most prestigious university.”’
 Although Uzbek respondents considered 
higher education to be relevant for their 
professional futures, in comparison to the Kyrgyz 
group only a few of them (especially among the 
young women) had enrolled in universities. For 
young female Uzbeks, the stated lack of readiness 
of their parents to ‘invest’ in their daughters’ 
continuing education, or parents fears for their 
daughters’ safety and well-being once they left 
home to study in a city accounted for this. Some 
Uzbek male respondents were critical of the 
declining quality of instruction at local universities, 
and in case of limited financial means, also pointed 
out the necessity to work rather than study. 
 In relation to this, male respondents 
mentioned ‘short-term courses’ at private language 
institutes as an attractive alternative to university. 
Improving Russian or other language skills (e.g. 
Korean) was seen as an opportunity to prepare 
for labour migration to places such as Russia or 
South Korea. As has already been mentioned for 
the ethnic Kyrgyz, within the Uzbek group young 
people of both genders who reside in an urban 
setting also reported enjoying privileged access 
to extra-curricular opportunities in the domains of 
personal development or leisure activities.
 ‘Short-term courses’, lasting from six 
months to two years, and aimed at improving 
knowledge of topics such as culinary skills, 
medicine or (fashion) design, have become popular 
with young women. Uzbek respondents, especially 
in rural areas, remarked that such courses could 
be very convenient, because they enabled women 
to fulfil household chores and study at the same 
time; because they would be affordable also to 
less affluent families; and because parents could 
maintain control of their daughter’s reputation 
by not having to send her to a university in the 
city (for a prolonged period). Similarly to their 
Kyrgyz counterparts, an additional rationale for 
Uzbek parents behind investing in the continuing 
education and future professional opportunities 
of their daughters pertained to the heightened 
number of divorced young couples.
 The focus group discussions with Islamic 
clerics and elderly women of local neighbourhood 
communities addressed both the potentials and 
constraints for young Uzbek women in regard to 
studying and working. Although one cleric clearly 
remarked that, from a religious standpoint, there 
should be no limit to the professional achievements 
of a woman, ‘…she can even become a president…’, 
the conditions that need to be met in order for 
such goals to be realised are significant. Many of 
these draw on the perception of gender relations 
within a family, where, as outlined by the same 
cleric, ‘at home’ the woman should be ‘modest’ 
and ‘respectful’ towards her husband; where, 
especially in case of insufficient resources, male 
education is to be prioritised in order for them to 
fulfil their duties as breadwinners, ‘teachers’ and 
‘guides’ for their women through life; and, finally, 
where female education shall be utilised less for 
income purposes than for childrearing. Further 
conditions should ideally apply to the potential 
working environment of a woman: contact with 
males outside their own kinship group (mahram) 
should be minimised, and during business-trips 
lasting longer than three days, women should be 
accompanied by one of their mahram males. In 
Kyrgyzstan’s rather secularised working realities, 
such principles, even if not fully enforced, severely 
limit the actual career opportunities of Uzbek 
women, to, in best-case scenarios, the fields of 
medicine or teaching. 
 But even those young Uzbek women for 
whom their families have opened the way towards 
higher education may face the possibility of never 
graduating, should they marry at the ‘usual age’ 
of 21 or 22 and the new in-laws prohibit their 
further studies. The following story of an Uzbek 
mother in her 50s vividly illustrates the multiple 
social pressures from within and outside her own 
family which she had to fight against in order for 
her daughter not to be ‘married off early’, but to 
receive further education, both at university and 
in the aforementioned household-related short 
courses:
‘I firmly stood up for it, I was just fighting for 
it! My daughter and I won the fight!...They said, 
“What is the need for a girl to study? We will 
marry her off!” At that time, many families were 
marrying off their daughters one by one. I said: 
“No way. She is too young! She is not ready yet!” 
We were already receiving matchmakers. But 
you should know when your child is ready for 
marriage and when not, shouldn’t you? Why 
should I make her suffer?…
Re
se
ar
ch
 o
n 
Pr
of
es
si
on
al
 a
nd
 M
ar
ria
ge
 C
ho
ic
es
 o
f Y
ou
th
 in
 K
yr
gy
zs
ta
n
31
In our mahalla [neighbourhood] only my 
daughter received a university education. 
Other girls finished school after 9th grade and 
attended informal household-related courses. 
My daughter argued with her friends: “Are these 
courses enough for you? Why don’t you fight for 
your rights?” She also wanted to attend the same 
courses as her friends. I said: “You can attend 
informal courses during vacations, if you are 
interested”. The first year she attended baking 
courses, the next knitting courses, and the last, 
courses of how to sew curtains because she was 
interested in it. She earned quite enough money 
sewing curtains. Now her in-laws are very happy 
with her, as she has higher education and can 
sew. Nowadays, mothers-in-law pay attention 
to these kind of skills.’
 At the other end of the spectrum, many 
families, in particular those without educated or 
working female members, apparently submit to 
the social trends within tightly knit and traditional 
local units such as a neighbourhood communities 
(mahallas). For young Uzbek women whose futures 
become exclusively constructed through the 
prism of marriage and domestic life, this can even 
initiate doubts about the usefulness of secondary 
education:
‘In our days men prohibit their wives from going 
out of the home, force them to wear a headscarf 
and do not allow them to work. That is why girls 
do not aspire to get higher education and prefer 
attending informal courses. They think: “My 
husband will not allow me to work. It is difficult to 
find a job for men, so for me there is no job. Why 
should I waste my time for university?” It is rare 
when a man allows his wife to work. Moreover, 
they force girls to drop out of university after 
marriage, or plan to marry uneducated girls.’
 In line with the patriarchal understanding 
that ‘for a woman family has priority over a career’, 
most married Uzbek women reported that they 
quit their jobs or began working part-time in order 
to readjust the balance between professional and 
domestic life and resolve family tensions. 
 The majority of young Uzbek respondents 
imagined their future careers in self-employment 
and the private sector. It was mentioned that quite 
a lot of young Uzbeks entered into apprenticeship-
agreements with a ‘master’ while they were still at 
secondary school - for example hairdressing or 
crafts for boys, mostly sewing for girls - which upon 
school graduation they would pursue as their full-
time occupation. Further plans mentioned were to 
open their own business or expand on (parents’) 
existent ones, such as pharmacies, beauty parlours 
or grocery stores. Some respondents mentioned 
the idea of exporting agricultural goods or 
establishing trade representations of international 
companies in Kyrgyzstan, particularly in the city 
of Osh. Young Uzbek males stated that the major 
reason for their strong preference for the private 
sector was the conviction that they could not 
advance their careers in Kyrgyzstan’s government 
institutions due to their disadvantageof belonging 
to an ethnic minority. This is slightly different for 
Uzbek women, some of whom still work in the public 
sector, mostly as teachers or accountants, and 
reported being satisfied with their opportunities 
to develop these career paths.
 A few Uzbek respondents remarked that 
they feel discriminated against in the workplace, 
at school or at university, based on their ethnicity 
or religious convictions. Some university students, 
for example, claimed that instructors would give 
ethnic Uzbeks lower scores, and that they had 
even been verbally abused by university staff. The 
following quote illustrates workplace tensions at a 
school because of an Uzbek employee wearing a 
hijab: 
‘I wear a hijab. When I came to the school where I 
used to work, they demanded I take off my hijab, 
or tie the headscarf from behind my head. When 
I said that I could not do this because there were 
men around, the director demanded a letter of 
resignation from me and to quit.’
 Most Uzbek respondents reflected that 
women are not encouraged to seek employment 
outside the home. The reasons given are similar to 
those that could also be heard among parts of the 
Kyrgyz group, namely that women might become 
targets for sexual harassment and their earnings 
would not be equally ‘blessed’ as those of men, 
while economic independence will encourage 
disobedience and challenge the patriarchal 
family order. However, some respondents stated 
that, if a man’s earnings are insufficient, income 
generated from female home-based work would 
be acceptable, for example from sewing or baked 
goods. 
 On the other hand, males with higher 
education in particular, and those with first-
hand experience of working mothers or sisters, 
expressed supportive views, such as that a woman 
who manages both work and domestic spheres 
enjoys respect in society. While those men in 
favour of working women predominantly point out 
the material benefits that this would bring to the 
family budget, working female Uzbek respondents 
emphasised the social and psychological benefits, 
such as: ‘self-confidence because of the ability to 
earn for themselves and the children’, a ‘sense 
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of achievement to be a benefit to society’, being 
‘an inspiration for children and for those women 
who cannot work because of society’s constraints’, 
‘expanding their social network’, and the motivation 
to ‘take care of their appearance’. Anxieties about 
male inadequacies stand in opposition to such 
experiences of female empowerment and are 
reflected, as previously noted, in a strict zero-sum-
perception of gender relations. Such is especially 
evident among those Uzbek men who initially 
depict working women as more educated, assertive 
and reliable, and then argue strongly against their 
own wives or daughters taking up employment for 
those exact same reasons.
 The handling of income generated by 
working women reveals different aspects of 
(traditionally) patriarchal gender relations and 
basic Islamic principles. Most Uzbek respondents 
stated that money would be managed jointly within 
the family, which in practice means for women that 
their earnings are either fully controlled by their 
husband or his parents, or that they are supposed 
to use them on everyday expenses, such as those 
related to childrearing. During the focus group 
discussion, a local cleric remarked that, in fact, 
such merging of a woman’s budget with that of a 
family violates Sharia law: 
‘I will tell you a law in Islam. The husband’s 
income is common and the wife’s one is her 
own…The husband cannot spend his wife’s 
money, but the wife can spend her husband’s 
money, because his money is common for the 
whole family. A woman’s income is her own only.’
 In comparison to the Kyrgyz group, only 
a few Uzbek women seem to have their own 
experiences of labour migration. Female migrants 
were either part of (extended) family groups 
that relocated to Russia, where they would still 
be responsible for exclusively domestic work; or 
they migrated with the intention to earn their 
own income, because the absence of a male 
breadwinner forced them to do so.
 Marriage and (A)SRH Health
 Choices
 Among most Uzbek respondents, 20-22 
was considered the ideal age for women to marry, 
while for young men this was set at 24-26 years.
Those female respondents who were married at 
an early age indicated that they had been quite 
unaware of the meaning and responsibilities 
associated with marriage and that they were told 
by their parents to take this step, rather than 
having been involved in the decision themselves. 
Often this was combined with the fact that 
marriage among Uzbek youth is usually planned 
within a short period of time, and thus the young 
couple have few opportunities to get to know and 
evaluate each other beforehand.
 Different social dynamics could be 
identified as leading towards early marriage. 
Among them was that older daughters experienced 
pressure to marry earlier than they would have 
wished, in order to clear the way for their younger 
siblings, as is exemplified in this quote:
‘I have a younger sister. She has grown up faster 
than me, so matchmakers started to come to her 
to ask for marriage, instead of to me. That is why 
I had to marry early.’ 
 Outside their own family, the collective 
expectations of friends, neighbours or other peer 
groups stigmatised those women who, due to 
their on-going studies or employment, aimed to 
delay their marriage. This can be illustrated with 
the following quote from a young Uzbek woman:
‘All of my friends had already got married, even 
those who were younger than me had children. 
I got married when I was 24. Neighbours and 
relatives perceived me as if I had some defect. 
I attended university, which my married friends 
and relatives did not. They had married right 
after finishing school. But people did not want 
to understand it…Perhaps I decided to marry 
because I was bothered by stigmas. When I saw 
my friends with their children, it seemed as if I 
am going to stay without children. By the time 
I graduated, my peers already had three or four 
children. The neighbours spread rumours that 
my parents were not behaving properly, so no 
one wanted to marry me, and that we were too 
poor to afford the wedding expenses and so on. 
Maybe I got married to eliminate these kind of 
rumours.’
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While discussing cases of early marriage, for 
example that of a 16-year-old girl who had to get 
married before the deaths of her grandparents, 
an Islamic cleric voiced the following opinion, 
juxtaposing physical and mental preparedness for 
entering wedlock:
‘I do not encourage [parents] to marry off girls 
even at 18 or 19 years of age. Why? Physical 
readiness does not always ensure the ability to 
deal with married life. There is “bitterness” and 
“sweetness” in family life. They should be ready 
to deal sensibly with sweetness, and to stand 
and be patient when they face bitterness. They 
should rationally recognise these kinds of things. 
So, let us say 23 is the ideal age for marriage. 
After 23 there is a stigma of “old maid” in our 
society. As for boys, the earliest age is 21, and no 
limit for late marriage.’
 At the same time, neither this cleric nor any 
other reported a case where they actively opposed 
underage marriage, and, for example, refused to 
perform the Islamic marriage ceremony (nikah). 
In this regard, secular reasons for early marriage, 
including the perception of a girl as an economic 
burden for her birth family, seemed to predominate 
even over such religious opinions. 
 Within the Uzbek community of Osh (city 
and oblast), the 2010 violent interethnic conflict 
apparently aggravated concerns about unmarried 
women’s physical safety and sexual integrity, which 
led to situations in which Uzbek girls were reportedly 
‘married off’ as early as 16 years of age. Often, such 
young brides also suffered from psychological 
violence or early divorce and were stigmatised 
by husbands and in-laws as ‘humanitarian aid 
daughters-in-law’ (gumpomoshchkelins) or 
‘daughters-in-law for free’ (bekerkelins). The fact 
that it was predominantly Uzbek families who 
turned to such practices of early marriage at this 
time, rather than Kyrgyz families who inhabited the 
same conflict area, could be taken to indicate the 
low levels of trust in the local law enforcement and 
justice system among the Uzbek ethnic minority 
(but also among other minority groups, such as 
the Tajiks, Turks and Kurds; see below).
 Although Uzbek respondents of both 
sexes indicated that their parents would serve 
as important roles models for their own married 
life, young men and women differed in regards 
to the sources from which they received actual 
information on the topic of sexuality and puberty. 
While females of all age-groups, educational 
and regional backgrounds named their mothers 
or elder sisters as essential interlocutors, their 
male counterparts seemed to avoid raising this 
topic within their families, and instead claimed 
that older peers (friends) or religious sources 
(books, imams, Friday sermons) were influential 
for them. For young men, religious explanations 
were considered trustworthy for delicate topics 
such as puberty and sexuality, alongside sources 
such as anatomy lessons in school, the internet 
or TV. Furthermore, when it came to reflecting 
preferences and expectations for married life, it 
was noticeable that young women with higher 
education showed themselves to be less reserved 
in addressing these topics. 
 In comparison to the Kyrgyz group, divorce 
seems to be more stigmatised among the Uzbek 
respondents. However, the main reasons for 
divorce are similar: early marriage, continuous 
domestic violence and family tensions, in particular 
with the wife’s mother-in-law. In regards to the 
treatment of a new daughter-in-law (kelin), the 
voice of an Islamic cleric during a focus group 
discussion again revealed a discrepancy between 
the actual experiences of young Uzbek wives and 
the ways outlined in Islam. The cleric stated that 
in cases of ‘disobedience, disloyalty or ill conduct’, 
a husband’s options for discipline should never 
include physical violence. (First, he could verbally 
reprimand his wife, then separate his bed from hers, 
and only then either give her a non-violent blow 
with a teeth-cleaning twig, or ‘push her in such a 
way that she falls onto a soft place’.) Furthermore, 
he clarified that daughters-in-law do not have an 
obligation ‘to serve’ in their new families, but that 
their contribution to household chores should be 
considered as a voluntary and charitable act.
 Other manifestations of A/SRH Health 
Choices, such as non-marital pregnancy following 
labour migration to Russia, can be detected among 
Uzbek youth as well. However, in comparison 
to the reflections of Kyrgyz respondents, such 
phenomena seemed to either occur less frequently 
within Uzbek families, or be subject to a stronger 
taboo of speaking about them (to strangers).
 Discussion
 In comparison to their Kyrgyz peers, 
young Uzbek women could be observed to enjoy 
less leverage when it came to negotiating their 
opportunities for education and employment with 
their parents, husbands or in-laws. Co-habitation 
within the extended family seemed to be a factor 
that ‘traditionalised’ gender perceptions, because 
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expectations of ‘right conduct’ become articulated 
and monitored by parents, or maybe grandparents, 
on a daily basis. Even a progressive husband would 
be likely to feel the need to at least partially comply 
with these. 
 Beyond the family, the mahalla 
neighbourhood communities in which most Uzbek 
families are embedded did not only provide them 
with essential networks of mutual support, but also 
were the prime unit where a family’s reputation was 
decided. Often the mahalla can be understood as 
a localised social environment where the collective 
force of a homogenising patriarchal opinion 
complicates any attempts to pursue alternative 
life-trajectories. From the voices of Uzbek female 
respondents, it could be observed that from this 
setting emerge sequences of conditional decisions 
observing a hierarchy of wife-husband-family-
mahalla. In that hierarchy, young Uzbek women 
often perceived themselves to have few chances 
to participate, as is captured in the two following 
quotes:
‘If I will not marry, I will focus on my career. If 
I will marry, and my husband will allow me to 
work and will support me, I will balance between 
work and family. …I do not know what kind of 
person I will marry. So, my career depends on 
my marriage.’
‘To be honest, I’m not planning to work after 
graduating from university. Family is foremost 
for me. If my future husband allows me to work, 
I will; otherwise I will stay at home and devote 
myself to childrearing.’
 As has been noted before, such a scenario 
should be understood to differ in degree and 
probability from others, and not be seen as 
one that would be exclusively Uzbek. Similarly, 
‘traditional’ family situations were also depicted 
by ethnic Kyrgyz women, especially those residing 
in rural and southern areas of the country. 
Furthermore, previous paragraphs have mentioned 
Uzbek voices that advocated for young women’s 
expansion of skill-sets (via short-courses) and 
continued education, which would allow them to 
gain more independence from their husbands or 
in-laws. It was noticed that male support for such 
development ranked highest among those who 
themselves had a higher education, and those 
with first-hand experiences of working mothers 
or sisters. But whereas male respondents pointed 
out the material benefits of women’s employment, 
female respondents by contrast highlighted the 
social and psychological benefits, such as improved 
self-confidence.
 The perception of the ideal age for young 
Uzbek women to marry being 20-22 years, 
according to most respondents, and the strong 
stigmatisation of ‘old brides’ within the marriage 
market, could be considered as additional factors 
influencing choices around continuing female 
education. If the transition from the birth family 
to that of the husband can be expected to occur 
while a young Uzbek woman is still studying, 
and if experience suggests that the new in-laws’ 
continued support for her education is doubtful, 
then her parents might consider it most ‘rational’ 
not to motivate their daughter to pursue higher 
education. In the aftermath of the 2010 violence 
in southern Kyrgyzstan, the phenomenon of 
‘marrying off’ underage girls in order to protect 
them from possible sexual harassment or rape, 
which would make their future marriage practically 
impossible, caused some members of Uzbek 
communities to doubt even the ‘usefulness’ of 
secondary education. 
 The statements of Uzbek Islamic clerics 
revealed that religious tenets would in fact oppose 
some of the constraining ‘traditionalisms’, such as 
under-age marriage or the rejection of working 
women. 
 However, it could not be observed that 
from the spiritual domain there arose a significant 
impact towards taming existent patriarchal 
anxieties about educated and self-confident 
women (which before has been discussed as a 
zero-sum-perspective on gender-relations). In 
practice, everyday male interpretations of Islam 
and traditions tended to establish preconditions 
for Uzbek female employment, which often meant 
that these women have only a hypothetical chance 
to participate in Kyrgyzstan’s largely secularised 
working environment. Actual participation was 
often unrealistic, as it could not meet these 
preconditions.
 Male and female Uzbek respondents, 
although hesitantly, indicated other developments 
that pointed to a shrinking opportunity structure 
and a continuous narrowing of their niches within 
Kyrgyzstan’s education and economic sectors. 
Young Uzbeks reported that, following their 
secondary education, for which they could still 
attend institutionalised Uzbek-language schools, 
they do not have equal chances of success in the 
countrywide university admissions test (ORT), 
because as of 2013 this can only be taken in 
either the ‘state language’ of Kyrgyz or the ‘official 
language’ of Russian. Uzbek women of different 
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ages shared instances when they felt they had 
experienced religious discrimination, as, for 
example,when a female teacher was threatened 
with dismissal because of wearing a ‘hijab’ at 
school. A majority of young Uzbek respondents 
envisioned their professional futures in self-
employment, which was framed as a necessary 
adjustment in response to the preferential 
treatment given to ethnic Kyrgyz in the job market 
since 2010, which has further decreased Uzbeks’ 
opportunities to enter the public sector.
 Later paragraphs illustrated the way in which 
‘sabr’, the Arabic term depicting Islamic virtues 
of ‘endurance’, ‘patience’ and ‘perseverance’, 
encapsulates a key modus operandi for young 
Uzbeks in contemporary Kyrgyzstan. ‘Sabr’ is 
essential not only because Uzbeks may be drawing 
more inspiration from Islam than their peers of 
different ethnic belonging, such as when young 
Uzbek men significantly sought for knowledge 
on puberty, sexuality and marriage from religious 
sources. ‘Sabr’ is also understood to be necessary 
due to the Uzbeks’ disadvantaged status as ‘the 
other’ major ethnic group in southern Kyrgyzstan, 
especially after the  events of 2010. And finally, 
many young Uzbek women noted a mother’s 
‘patient’ (sabirli) approach to life as the superior 
qualification for their role model, which reflects a 
rather observant and non-confrontational stance 
of waiting for incremental change to happen.
Russian Youth and a
(Soviet-inspired) Modern 
Society in Central Asia
 The focus of this section will be on 
the opportunity structures and perception of 
gender relations among young female and male 
respondents of the ethnic Russian group. Nation-
wide, the Russians represent 6% of Kyrgyzstan’s 
population.7 Regionally, their representation is 
stronger in the northern areas of the country, 
especially in Chuy and Issyk-Kul oblasts, and in the 
capital Bishkek, where they amount to 14.8%.8 The 
headline’s reference to a Soviet-inspired ‘modern 
society’ (sovremennoye obshchestvo) in Central 
Asia aims to capture the comparative significance 
of smaller family units, equal decision-making and 
female societal participation among Kyrgyzstan’s 
second largest ethnic (but non-indigenous) 
minority.
 Following a brief comment on the data 
source for this section of the report, the themes 
that will be explored among young Russians are 
‘Family Backgrounds’, ‘Professional Choices’ and 
‘Marriage and A/SRH Health Choices’.
 Data Source
 Data for this section were gathered in 
Chuy and Issyk-Kul oblasts, as well as in the 
capital Bishkek. In total, 34 interviews were 
conducted, among them 23 with young females 
and 11 with young males. Of the respondents, 28 
were unmarried, five were married and one was 
divorced. 
 Two focus group discussions took place in 
Bishkek and the city of Karakol (Issyk-Kul oblast). 
Participants in these discussions were Russian 
youth and parents.
 Family Backgrounds
 Young Russian respondents were 
outspoken about both permanent and periodic 
tensions in their family lives. Among the major 
triggers for conflict, respondents mentioned 
precarious financial situations, unemployment 
of both or one parent (often fathers), domestic 
violence and alcohol abuse (predominantly by 
males but also by females). 
 One noticeable feature, especially in 
comparison to the other ethnic groups discussed 
here, was a high rate of divorce and single 
parenthood. In consequence, some young Russian 
males and females remarked that, due to their 
parents’ divorce, they had been raised by only 
their mothers or their grandparents. In a few cases 
in Chuy oblast, respondents reported that they 
were sent to orphanages after their parents had 
failed to fulfil or had abused their parental rights. 
 In relation to this, Russian respondents 
assessed the family dynamics of other ethnic 
groups favourably, contrasting, for example, the 
close ties among Kyrgyz relatives with the prevailing 
‘ignorance’ within Russian families in regard to 
divorce or the neglect of children or grandparents. 
This was also reflected in the fact that young 
Russian respondents rarely indicated their parents 
or other family members as role models with whom 
they associate positive qualities such as a strong 
personality or being able to cope with difficulties.
7 See National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic (2016a).
8 See National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic (2016b).
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 Professional Choices:
 Education and Occupation
 Russian respondents from Issyk-Kul oblast 
had mostly had nine years of secondary school 
education, after which they continued in vocational 
schools in the city of Karakol (Issyk-Kul oblast), or, 
rarely, in Bishkek. Respondents in both rural and 
urban settings reported that they were generally 
satisfied with their school facilities and also with 
those ‘older teachers’ who had been trained during 
the Soviet era. They mentioned racketeering and 
other forms of violence as the main challenges 
and tensions of their school lives, which among 
Russian students in Chuy oblast and Bishkek city 
were associated with their lack of Kyrgyz language 
skills (unlike in Issyk-Kul oblast where respondents 
communicate in Kyrgyz). Furthermore, young 
Russian respondents criticised a learning 
environment that did not ‘inspire to discover’ and 
which constrained the expression of alternative 
opinions. This is captured in the following quote:
‘I wished to study a lot, but when the teacher 
does not know more [than the students], and 
even the whole school system does not teach 
anything interesting, all is supposed to be done 
according to older standards. And you cannot 
say any criticism or disagree with teachers…I 
was disappointed.’
 Both male and female Russian respondents 
highlighted the relevance of post-secondary 
education for future professional success. However, 
when examining actual income opportunities, this 
picture became more complex. Among Russian 
respondents, those with a vocational school 
degree were employed and reported to have a 
permanent income, whereas those with higher 
education often had to re-orientate towards the 
service or freelance sectors, where their diplomas or 
professional knowledge would not be required. This 
also reflected the perception that, the actual impact 
of post-secondary education on social mobility 
notwithstanding, obtaining a diploma continues to 
serve as a significant marker for the establishment of 
personal self-esteem and for the social recognition 
of belonging to the higher social strata of ‘educated’ 
people. Pursuit of higher education could be 
observed in particular among those Russian 
respondents who had seen that their parents’ 
limited secondary education had not translated into 
a decent livelihood. At the same time, it was also 
this group,which appeared the least likely to expect 
financial and emotional support or guidance from 
within their family to pursue these aspirations.
 In regard to accessing secondary and post-
secondary education, young Russian males and 
females could be said to enjoy equal opportunities. 
Differences were noticeable not with regard to 
gender and education, but rather in the ways in 
which residents of various regional backgrounds 
made their study choices. In this respect, youth 
in Issyk-Kul oblast seemed to have developed a 
rather pragmatic approach that allowed them 
to remain flexible in light of changes in the 
local labour market. Enrolment in local higher 
educational institutions, such as Karakol State 
University, rather than aiming towards options in 
Bishkek, was accompanied by readiness to switch 
to other specialisations that were in more demand, 
even if that entailed a transfer from university to 
vocational school (or the other way round).
 For Bishkek families, by contrast, the priority 
was not the actual labour market situation but rather 
to send their sons and daughters to prestigious 
universities in the capital, such as the American 
University of Central Asia (AUCA). Sometimes this 
resulted in an education that individual students 
later found difficult to capitalise on. One such case 
was that of Alexandra, who was encouraged by her 
parents to undertake ‘American Studies’ at AUCA, 
despite her own interest in the tourism sector. 
Upon graduation from AUCA, she realised that her 
diploma only qualified her to work in libraries or 
museums. She then decided to study law at the 
Kyrgyz-Russian-Slavic University in Bishkek, where 
however she was much disappointed in the quality 
of teaching. She remarked that both of her higher 
education diplomas are now ‘lying around without 
much use’:
‘I finished secondary school close to Bishkek 
Humanities University, where I became 
interested in the faculty of tourism. But my 
parents did not like it and forbade me to apply 
for it. They said no! My mum wanted me to try 
to become a lawyer, and they both insisted on 
it…Now both diplomas are just lying around. 
The knowledge level is, roughly speaking, zero. 
I have not worked in any of the specialisations I 
pursued!’
 Such a discrepancy between original 
career aspirations and later income opportunities 
was a common trend that could be observed 
among Russian youth (and all ethnic groups 
more generally). Cases of both male and female 
respondents showed that a relatively high number 
of those who studied to become lawyers, teachers, 
accountants or tourism professionals, for example, 
later on did not work in their field of education or 
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were unemployed. Among the reasons given for 
this situation were high unemployment rates in 
rural areas, low salaries in the teaching or tourism 
sector (in the Issyk-Kul area), and weak social 
networks that did not facilitate finding employment. 
Furthermore, some Russian respondents remarked 
that after graduation the ability to speak Kyrgyz 
became a significant factor when entering the job 
market. In this regard, Russian youth from Bishkek 
or Chuy oblast seemed to be less prepared than 
those originating from the Issyk-Kul area, because 
the latter, having grown up in this predominantly 
rural and Kyrgyz-speaking environment, 
understood from early on the necessity to develop 
this language skill for their local integration. This is 
also captured in the following quote:
‘I know how it is usually done in this country. You 
have to have networks, good social networks [to 
find a job]. I know a girl who is working in a 
bank. She graduated with me, but found a job 
easily because she knew someone from that 
bank. She is Kyrgyz, but I could not easily find 
a job. You know, you also have to speak Kyrgyz 
while providing services to clients.’
 Consequently, the alternative for many 
Russian youth with higher education was 
employment in the service sector, such as a 
vendor in a shop, waiter, taxi driver or free-lance 
tourist guide, which does not require their original 
professional qualification. At the same time, male 
respondents from Issyk-Kul oblast expressed 
satisfaction with their vocational school education 
and the income opportunities it opened up to 
them, which was substantiated by the fact that 
most of them were able to secure employment 
shortly after graduation.
 During the focus group discussions, 
Russian respondents pointed out the ethnic 
aspects of employment structures in Kyrgyzstan, 
remarking that Russians could become established 
within the technical and service sectors, but were 
under-represented in state structures (similarly to 
the ethnic Uzbek group). According to this view, 
employers prefer Russian-speaking personnel 
of ‘Slavic appearance’ for administrative and 
front-service positions, considering them to 
be ‘more qualified, reliable, honest and clean’. 
(The phenotypical preference is at times even 
indicated in the advertisement of the position.) For 
similar reasons, ethnic Russian medical doctors, 
technicians and engineers, drivers and teachers 
often enjoy a better reputation than those of 
Kyrgyz or other ethnic belonging. This favourable 
perspective on Russian professionalism and 
reliability is no less widespread among the non-
Russian ethnic groups themselves, which may be 
interpreted as a continuation of the previously 
shared Soviet experience where ‘development’ 
(and atheistic modernity) was said to have been 
exported from European-Russia to Central Asia.
 With regard to internal migration, amongst 
the most prevailing reasons why young Russians 
relocated from villages to cities in the Issyk-Kul 
area, or to Bishkek, are education, employment 
(including seasonal labour), marriage and divorce. 
Interestingly, quite a number of respondents 
reported returning to their home regions of Chuy 
or Issyk-Kul after graduation, due to marriage 
and local income opportunities, or as a result of 
urban unemployment and higher living expenses 
in Bishkek.
 Mobility beyond Kyrgyzstan’s borders 
is almost exclusively directed towards Russia 
and Kazakhstan. All young Russian respondents 
knew female Russian migrants personally from 
among their family members or friends who 
had spent time in Russia. Around one third of 
respondents had experienced international 
migration themselves, mostly staying in Russian 
cities where relatives or acquaintances were 
permanent residents. The readiness to migrate 
abroad appeared to correlate with the degree of 
local integration. Accordingly, respondents from 
Issyk-Kul oblast, who expressed a strong sense of 
belonging to their local communities, and also had 
better Kyrgyz language skills than their Bishkek co-
ethnics, were rather hesitant to leave for Russia, 
arguing that they would already be ‘too Asian’ or 
‘too Kyrgyz’ to be fully accepted there. By contrast, 
Russian respondents from Bishkek or Chuy oblast 
noted a stronger readiness to emigrate to Russia 
permanently.9
 Female Russian respondents generally held 
favourable views about migrant women, who they 
perceive as seeking better study and employment 
opportunities. By contrast, male respondents 
supported educational migration, but were 
opposed to the idea of women working abroad. 
Within the local context of Kyrgyzstan, however, 
it was noticeable that male Russian respondents 
tended to be supportive of women as co-
breadwinners. Accordingly, in married families, it 
is predominantly the case that both spouses were 
employed, which was presented as an inevitable 
phenomenon of a ‘modern’ society. Female Russian 
9 In-between 1989 and 2016, the number of ethnic Russians in Kyrgyzstan fell from 916,500 to 360,600 (National Statistical Committee of the 
Kyrgyz Republic 2016a).
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respondents readily listed multiple advantages of 
working women, such as economic independence 
from a spouse or elevated self-confidence. At the 
same time, however, respondents reflected that a 
woman should not flaunt her independence, but 
rather present her professional ambitions as a 
‘back-up’ to those of her male partner.
 A few cases were reported where married 
women left their jobs due to feelings of jealousy 
from their husbands, or for fear of possible sexual 
harassment at work and on the way there. This is 
reflected in the following quote:
‘I am unemployed now, but I worked and I 
liked it. For example, I was a waitress, but my 
husband forced me to stop, because customers 
could show their interest and accost me. And 
work finished late in the evenings, it was also 
dangerous to get home at nights…’
 Marriage and (A)SRH 
 Health Choices
 Decision-making among Russian married 
couples was perceived to be an equally shared 
responsibility. In regard to labour division, a 
gendered perspective was recognisable, although 
it was not as clearly observed as in the Uzbek 
ethnic group, for example. The following quote 
from a young woman exemplifies the fact that 
the assignment of responsibility for household 
chores to females (or for balancing these with a 
woman’s professional life) is not an exclusively 
male perspective:
‘All in all, a woman should deal with her own 
duties. A man should not stand in the kitchen, 
a man should provide for the family, take 
responsibility for the financial plans of the 
family, of course, if he has these possibilities…
For myself I have decided, even though it was a 
hard decision, that the kitchen is the place for a 
woman…’
By contrast, several male respondents stated that 
domestic tasks should be shared between spouses, 
especially if a wife is already busy with her outside 
employment:
‘She can work, and I should work. It is ok, if both 
wife and husband work. However, domestic 
duties should be divided equally. If she works 
hard and is not able to come home earlier, I can 
support her, I can cook.’
 Unlike all other ethnic groups discussed 
here, co-habitation prior to marriage was widely 
practised among young Russian males and 
females. Sharing a household before conducting 
a religious marriage ceremony and official 
registration was considered to be a good way of 
getting to know a future spouse.
 As far as interethnic marriages are 
concerned, in urban contexts these do take place 
and seemed to be acceptable, whereas in rural 
areas ‘cultural differences’ were understood to be 
a factor complicating such marriages. This was 
also the case among those Russian respondents 
of the Issyk-Kul area, who otherwise stated that 
they were well integrated into local communities. 
The viewpoint that ‘different ethnic backgrounds’ 
or ‘different religious affiliations’ might trigger 
conflicts in families is well illustrated in the first 
of the following quotes. The second quote is the 
story of a young Russian woman who had married 
a Kyrgyz man at the age of 18, but was now 
divorced:
‘I had this idea [to marry someone of another 
ethnic group], but then I imagined that it will 
be difficult for me in another family. I will not 
be accepted there, because I am different, I have 
different moral norms and traditions. I myself 
could not be there.’
We had very different worldviews. Of course, I 
knew it before getting married to a Kyrgyz guy, 
but I did not think that it could be that decisive. 
Relations with his mother were horrible. She was 
always dissatisfied with me and with what I was 
doing…’
 Cultural differences aside, divorced 
women indicated pervasive domestic violence 
(physical, verbal and psychological abuse) as the 
predominant cause for their separation. Young 
Russian respondents did not reflect on divorce as a 
tragic event. Rather, divorce was considered as an 
inevitable step in cases where a family encountered 
a deep crisis, such as the alcohol addiction of a 
spouse. Divorced Russian women seem not to be 
similarly stigmatised as those from other ethnic 
groups, and re-marrying was described as a 
feasible future scenario. Following divorce, young 
mothers often did not receive financial support 
from their former husbands, either for themselves 
or for their biological children. Notably, none of 
the female respondents affected attempted to 
legally enforce such entitlements, and the fact 
that divorced fathers had an obligation to care for 
their children was not discussed.
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 Many young Russian respondents reported 
having experienced various forms of violence 
during childhood and within a relationship or 
marriage. Paradoxically, while male respondents 
claimed that the physical punishment of their 
wives was unacceptable and below their dignity, 
many female respondents found it acceptable 
that women should be punished when they 
‘misbehave’, ‘cannot control their tongue’ or ‘cheat 
on’ their partners. The combination of such female 
‘bad behaviour’ with male alcohol abuse was 
identified as a primary cause of violence in families 
(This did not entail reactive violence on behalf of 
the women, as this was perceived to be socially 
unacceptable.)
 Young male and female Russian 
respondents indicated the internet as their major 
source of information for questions on puberty 
and A/SRH Health Choices. The preference of the 
internet over alternative sources (parents, friends, 
school) occurred regardless of the respondents’ 
rural or urban background, and was apparently 
made based on the easy availability of a wide range 
of sources and because it did not demand personal 
interaction. While young Russians mentioned that 
parents would provide them with books and other 
reading material about issues of sexuality, female 
respondents in particular mentioned that although 
a mother could be considered a personal source 
of information, a child would need to proactively 
approach her.
 Some respondents within the Russian group 
explicitly remarked that, leading up to marriage, 
virginity would not matter as much to them as 
to other ethnic groups. It was more important 
that first sexual intercourse, which might happen 
as early as 14 years of age for males and 17 for 
females, was based on mutual consent. In the focus 
group discussion, the idea that adolescent Russian 
girls and young women could be perceived by 
members of other ethnic groups as ‘debauched’, 
‘sexually mature’ or ‘accessible’ was raised. It was 
felt that this made them easier targets for sexual 
harassment. The following quote hints at this:
‘Sometimes I have to walk home late in the 
evening after long working hours. I cannot 
even say how many times I have been offered 
a lift home! I was not even in a short skirt, but 
with a backpack on my back or with a bag…
And this is just because we are Russians. I do 
not know a girl of any other ethnicity who was 
offered a lift.’
 A final difference between the young 
Russian respondents and their contemporaries of 
other ethnic belonging was the perception of who 
would be to blame for non-marital pregnancy. 
Some Russian females, especially from rural 
areas, tended towards a rather patriarchal view 
that assigns the need to be responsible and 
knowledgeable exclusively to women. Rather 
than the ‘shame’ which this could bring upon 
a family, respondents pointed out that women 
should be ‘rational’ enough to understand that 
they could face single parenthood without any 
support from the child’s biological father. On the 
other hand, a majority of young Russian males and 
females foregrounded the shared responsibility 
of both partners for effective contraception and, 
in case of unplanned pregnancy, to deal with the 
consequences.
 Discussion
 The responses of Russian youth revealed 
that their coming of age occurs in quite different 
social settings from those experienced by their 
ethnic Kyrgyz or Uzbek peers. Young Russian 
males and females did not mention patterns 
of living as a couple within an extended family 
group, but rather reported a focus on the core-
family unit of parents and a few siblings. At 
the same time, Russian respondents were not 
hesitant to speak about family tensions and only 
a few nominated family members as their role 
models. Furthermore, there were self-critical 
remarks about the social ‘ignorance’ within many 
Russian families, which - in contrast to Kyrgyz 
configurations, for example - was considered 
responsible for the higher rates of divorce and 
neglect of children and grandparents.
 Young Russian females mainly reported 
enjoying equal opportunities to their male 
counterparts. No significant patriarchal constraints 
were named in regard to gaining education, 
taking-up employment or participating in family 
discussions or decision-making. 
 Rather than evidence of any gender 
imbalances, a trend could be observed whereby in 
the regional context of Issyk-Kul young Russians 
would flexibly and pragmatically adjust their 
(university or vocational) education to match 
actual labour market development, thereby 
increasing their later employment opportunities. 
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In contrast, the responses of young Russian males 
and females from Bishkek evidenced that in this 
setting, the prime orientation for educational 
choices was often prestige, both that of attending 
a particular university and the more personal one 
of ‘having a degree’. Detached from actual labour 
market needs, however, it was such university 
graduates in particular, who then found they had 
to take up temporary or low-salaried employment 
for which their professional qualification would 
not have been a requirement. 
 When assessing the labour market, young 
Russian respondents outlined the existence of an 
ethnic niche for their group in the service, medical 
and technical sectors, which are still informed by 
the Soviet association of ‘Slavs’ with qualities 
such as precision, honesty and reliability. Beyond 
this, Russian males and females voiced concerns 
that they are disadvantaged within Kyrgyzstan’s 
nepotistic labour market, due to their weak social 
networks and their lack of Kyrgyz language skills. 
With regard to the latter, a regional dynamic could 
again be identified, according to which young 
Russians from the Issyk-Kul area showed that 
they have embraced the Kyrgyz language more 
fully than their peers from Chuy oblast or the 
capital Bishkek. Although many young Russian 
respondents indicated that they have relatives 
in Russia, and also mentioned first- or second-
hand experiences with migrating there, there 
was widely shared doubt about the potential of 
Kyrgyzstani Russians to be accepted in Russia, 
because they had already become too close to 
the  ‘Asian mentality’.
 Concerning their sexual and family life, 
Russian women pointed to their opportunities to 
make their own decisions or to participate equally 
in joint decision-making. Unlike for their peers of 
other ethnicities, for young Russian females pre-
marital sex and co-habitation with a partner were 
acceptable practices, divorce was less stigmatised, 
and re-marrying was a realistic option. Russian 
women remarked, however, that due to such 
liberties they can be perceived by Kyrgyz men or 
those of other ethnic groups as easily ‘accessible’ 
and thus were prone to sexual harassment. 
 In young Russian families it was 
predominantly the case that both spouses worked, 
which women expressed as having the potential 
to elevate their self-confidence, and decision-
making was considered an equally shared 
responsibility. Young Russian respondents framed 
such personal lifestyles of equal freedoms and 
female societal participation as being in sync with 
a ‘modern society’ (sovremennoyeobshchestvo), 
for which the Soviet era’s socialist ‘achievements’ 
in Central Asia served as the inspirational 
template. Interestingly, patriarchal tendencies 
were introduced into this picture by some young 
Russian women, who, regardless of a general 
readiness among their male counterparts to share 
in household duties, declared for example that the 
kitchen is a ‘woman’s place’. Most strikingly, this 
was exemplified by cases where women remarked 
that their typically female ‘bad behaviour’ would 
at times deserve physical punishment.
Gender Perceptions within 
Smaller Ethnic Minority Groups: 
Young Tajiks, Kurds, Turks, 
Dungans and Uighurs in 
Kyrgyzstan
 This section will present insights on 
the opportunity structures and perceptions of 
gender relations among smaller minority groups 
represented in Kyrgyzstan. These are Tajiks (0.9%), 
Turks (0.7%) and Kurds, Dungans (1.1%) and 
Uighurs (0.9%).10 These groups enjoy stronger 
representations in certain regions of Kyrgyzstan 
and the interviews and focus group discussions for 
this report were arranged accordingly.
 Following a brief comment on its data 
sources, this section will highlight the most 
significant commonalities and differences that 
could be observed between the responses of 
young representatives from these smaller ethnic 
minorities and those of the Kyrgyz, Uzbek and 
Russian groups.
 Data Source
 In total, 29 interviews were conducted with 
young ethnic Tajiks, predominantly in the southern 
oblast of Batken (which borders with Tajikistan). 
Among respondents there were 23 females and six 
males, of whom 18 were unmarried and 11 were 
married. Another 16 interviews were conducted 
with respondents who identified as Turks or Kurds; 
13 of these were females and three males. From 
among ethnic Dungans, a total of 11 interviews 
10 See National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic (2016a).
Re
se
ar
ch
 o
n 
Pr
of
es
si
on
al
 a
nd
 M
ar
ria
ge
 C
ho
ic
es
 o
f Y
ou
th
 in
 K
yr
gy
zs
ta
n
41
were collected, predominantly in Issyk-Kul and 
Chuy oblasts. Of these respondents seven were 
young females and four were young males. With 
regard to civil status, seven were unmarried, 
three married and one divorced. Another eight 
interviews were conducted with ethnic Uighurs, 
predominantly in the northern oblasts of Issyk-Kul 
and Chuy and in the city of Bishkek. Among them 
were five young females and three young males, 
seven of whom were unmarried and one divorced. 
 Finally, two focus group discussions were 
organised, one with Tajik respondents in the 
village of Uchkorgon (Batken oblast) and one with 
representatives of the Turkish and Kurdish group 
in the village of Amanbaevo/Kyzyl-Adyr (Talas 
oblast).
 Tajik Youth
 Tajik youth resided predominantly within 
multi-generational households, where decision-
making was structured by age-hierarchy, gender 
and a collective focus on the family unit (as 
opposed to the interests of individual family 
members). Respondents described how it would 
usually be fathers who decided on matters such 
as a child’s education, marriage and employment, 
whereas mothers participated where domains 
such as household resources and expenses were 
concerned. Young Tajik females, similarly to their 
Uzbek peers, indicated their mothers as suitable 
role models, especially due to their strong will 
[sic!], patience and endurance (sabr).
 Educational choices for young Tajik 
women tended to be made for them by parents or 
older relatives. Few Tajik girls pursued education 
beyond the 9th grade, for which the main reasons 
given were financial constraints and the parents’ 
unwillingness to invest in a daughter’s continued 
education due to the low age-threshold for 
marriage within Tajik communities. This is also 
captured in the following quote from a young 
Tajik woman, now 24 years old and a mother of 
two, who was forced to leave school after the 9th 
grade:
‘…but then my mother said: “To get you into 
university our financial resources are not 
enough. Understand it right, what can we do?” 
My parents are unemployed and at home. If 
there is no financial assistance, it will be difficult 
for them. And I really did not want to burden 
them. What should I have done?’
 Similarly to the Uzbek group, Tajik 
respondents depicted the preference of family 
heads to constrain female mobility out of fear 
for its negative impact on the family’s reputation 
within the community, and general family harmony. 
This concerned both opposition to continued 
education for younger women, especially in cases 
when such would entail relocation to a city, and 
the conviction that a married woman should 
prioritise childrearing and household chores over 
ambitions to find employment outside the family 
home. This clear separation into a male-outside-
representational domain and a female-domestic-
caring domain can be illustrated by the following 
words of a Tajik male respondent:
‘But I think it is not right if I will sit at home 
with the children, thinking about what to cook 
for them, how to nurse them, while my wife will 
study, read and shine. I think it should be the 
other way round.’
 In line with this, migrant women, if not 
divorced or widowed, were perceived negatively. 
One respondent remarked on this topic that 
Tajiks would rather ‘die of hunger than send their 
women for migration’. The continued experience 
of subordination to patriarchal preferences, as 
this quote by a young woman reveals, may evoke 
drastic thoughts:
‘So every day in this community you see other 
people, so you draw conclusions. They suffer. 
Girls have more difficulties in their lives. So I 
do not want to give birth to a girl and see her 
sufferings, I will not able to watch her sufferings. 
So therefore, I do not want to have a daughter.’
 Young Tajik respondents referred to 
parental efforts at ‘matchmaking’ as the most 
traditional and predominant way of initiating 
marriage. However, such marital arrangements, 
which were made without the young bride’s and 
groom’s consent, were criticised as being unlikely 
to result in ‘happy’ families; as one respondent put 
it: ‘They live [in this arranged marriage], but they 
live like dead persons.’ In regard to forced marriage, 
cases were also mentioned in which the necessary 
documents to officially register a marriage were 
signed by the bride ‘at home’, and were then filed 
with the registry office by the husband or another 
male family member. This raises doubts as to 
whether the young woman’s signature was given 
voluntarily or under pressure.
 Tajik respondents also showed little trust 
in law enforcement agencies to deal with cases of 
domestic or other violence in their communities. 
In contrast to the other ethnic groups, however, 
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they mentioned the informal councils of village 
elders (aksakals) as an alternative way to resolve 
family or community matters (although the 
impartiality of male elders towards young female 
victims is questionable). Women mentioned the 
fear of stigmatisation and village rumours as 
additional reasons for not reporting violence, 
but also a lack of information on trustworthy 
organisations to approach (e.g. crisis centres). 
In consequence, those women who experienced 
violence of different sorts tended to ‘normalise’ 
this as an integral part of life, something they 
were fated to accept. The following quote from 
a 15-year-old Tajik female illustrates the fact that 
female ‘patience’ is conceived as the primary way 
of responding to violence from early socialisation 
on:
‘Be patient (sabyrduu). You will overcome these 
difficulties because of your patience. So in the 
future, you will have bright days. The moon has 
15 days of light and 15 days of darkness.’
 The focus group discussion among Tajik 
respondents showed that different opinions 
on family life, education and ideal marriage 
age exist between different generations. Older 
respondents criticised the fact that easy access 
to knowledge, migration to Russia, and the 
improved material situation from employment 
there would cause Tajik youth to loosen their ties 
to family and community and would liberalise 
them too much. 
 The younger generation, by contrast, 
reflected that women should at least obtain a 
vocational education after secondary school, 
before getting married. Although still arguing 
for a patriarchal family setup, men would prefer 
that their wives contributed to the overall 
budget. Accordingly, a trend could be observed 
whereby unmarried Tajik women attended 
practical skills courses (in cookery, sewing or 
hairdressing) while still at secondary school, 
in order to prepare for a future of being a co-
breadwinner (or an earning divorcee). Economic 
independence from parents prior to marriage 
was a related matter of discussion. This is well 
reflected in the words of a young Tajik university 
student, who openly expressed his intention to 
marry only in his 30s: 
‘I don’t want to ask my dad: “Dad, can you 
please feed me and my wife?” because he has 
another three young children to take care of.’
 Turkish and Kurdish Youth
 In comparison to other ethnic groups 
discussed in this report, the insights provided by 
members of the Turkish and Kurdish communities 
pointed to severe limitations for females to 
participate in family decision-making. This 
concerned education, marriage, employment and 
physical mobility.
 As regards educational development, 
among the Kurdish and Turkish communities of 
Talas oblast a significant early school dropout rate 
- after the 9th grade, and sometimes even after 
the 6th grade - could be noted. The major reasons 
given for this were domestic responsibilities, but 
the necessity for young family members to work in 
local bean fields, which for many households was 
the single source of income, was also a factor:
‘Usually children of our nationality are not 
allowed to go to school, education is considered 
to be useless, since children after school will be 
working in the fields.’
 A school teacher gave insights on the 
conflicting schedules that are a feature between 
the start of the school year (1st September) and 
the harvest season (September/October). Parents 
usually responded to her reminder about the 
obligation to attend school by saying that, before 
selling the harvest, their household budgets would 
simply not allow for buying school uniforms or 
other necessities:
‘It is a serious problem for school, especially in 
autumn. Parents openly tell us they cannot allow 
their children to attend school until they have 
harvested the beans. [They say:] “Are you going 
to feed them instead? They don’t even have 
shoes to wear!” Usually a five-person family 
cultivates up to five hectares of land. Almost no 
family has a harvesting machine, so that all the 
work has to be done manually. This is especially 
true for Turkish and Kurdish communities who 
are predominantly farmers.’
 For girls, the major reason for leaving 
school before graduation appeared to be early 
marriage. Respondents indicated this to occur 
at ages 16-17, but also as early as 14-15, often 
as a result of bride-kidnapping. This tendency 
for early marriage rested on the conviction that 
women beyond a certain age-threshold, usually 
25 years, were challenging marriage partners 
because it would take more effort to ‘re-socialise’ 
(perevospitat) them and have them assimilate 
Re
se
ar
ch
 o
n 
Pr
of
es
si
on
al
 a
nd
 M
ar
ria
ge
 C
ho
ic
es
 o
f Y
ou
th
 in
 K
yr
gy
zs
ta
n
43
to new family surroundings. At the same time, 
a significant number of such forced marriages, 
sometimes arranged by parents, were reportedly 
dissolved after only a few months of cohabitation.
 Despite this, respondents explained that 
to reject bride-kidnapping as an ethnic tradition 
would bring ‘shame’ on a bride’s family, which in 
consequence would also limit the opportunities 
for other siblings to find a marriage partner. In 
addition, for the kidnapped bride herself, as the 
following quote depicts, chances for another 
marriage in the future would be slim: 
‘If you were kidnapped once and refused to stay, 
other families will consider you as someone who 
has been married anyway.’
 The following case, described by a Kyrgyz 
school teacher who repeatedly tried to persuade 
a Kurdish family to allow their talented daughter 
to pursue further education, exemplifies the 
inclination to push young women into marriage, 
regardless of their academic or other future 
potential:
‘I should say some Kurdish and Turkish girls are 
very good at school…Etara, who finished 11th 
grade together with my daughter, was among 
the best pupils in her class. I talked to her parents 
several times, and requested very much that they 
let Etara continue her education after secondary 
school. She could have become at least a nurse, 
if she had entered the Talas medical college. But 
anyway…after school they married her off. Now 
she has two children.’
 During the same focus group discussion, a 
local Turkish community leader tried to bring the 
changing approach to education into perspective, 
highlighting that local families had only recently 
begun to embrace the value of knowledge for 
young men:
‘No way! A woman is a housewife. She is there 
to care for her husband and children. That is 
all that she does…Only in recent years have 
Turks slowly started paying attention to boys’ 
education. Before that children used to attend 
school only until the 4th or 5th grades, and that 
was all. Afterwards, parents used to send them to 
work in the fields. But now a few families started 
sending their sons to Turkish lyceums…and three 
boys even entered the [Kyrgyz-] Turkish Manas 
University in Bishkek.’
 Looking to the future, a local Islamic 
cleric expressed the need to also overcome 
problems of female illiteracy and women’s social 
marginalisation, citing his personal plans to enroll 
his eldest daughter in medical college:
‘I will openly tell, although it is being recorded, 
let it be. Today our girls need some occupation 
and education. They also need to become 
modern. Our girls are a bit wild: no school, 
no meetings [socialising], no community 
participation, no travel. All that they see is 
home, home and home. Most important is that 
they stay modest and honourable. Each of us 
has the right to choose one’s way. We are all 
anyway accountable in the face of Allah for 
parents, spouses and children…’
 For the moment, such ideas about working 
women are strongly rejected by male Kurdish 
and Turkish respondents. Furthermore, those few 
women who in fact worked in the bean fields, or 
as hired labour in other capacities, were said to 
give up control over this income to their husbands 
and in-laws. In addition, with regard to unreported 
incidents of domestic violence suffered by women, 
or the level of knowledge about A/SRH choices, 
the interview data marks the Kurdish and Turkish 
communities as lying at the furthest point of 
the spectrum of gender perceptions among the 
different ethnic groups discussed in this report, in 
terms of their very ‘traditional’ standpoint .
 Dungan Youth
 For young Dungan women, their position 
in family constellations and their participation in 
decision-making was reported to vary between 
different rural and urban locations. Females 
in cities such as Bishkek or Karakol (Issyk-
Kuloblast) tended to work to the same extent 
as their husbands, combining professional and 
domestic life. Husbands were reported to provide 
a supportive atmosphere in regard to their 
spouses’ career development and employment 
opportunities, although this did not necessarily 
entail taking over household or childrearing 
responsibilities. Family businesses with equal 
participation are common, such as running 
grocery shops or market stands. 
 In contrast, respondents reported that 
in villages or the city of Tokmok (Chuy oblast), 
it would rather be husbands - similar to other 
ethnic groups - who were the only breadwinners 
and dominated family decision-making, such 
as allocating household budgets. This was also 
reflected in the fact that urban female respondents 
identified their mothers as significant role models 
due to their impact on family matters, while rural 
respondents tended to praise their mothers’ 
excellency in performing domestic tasks.
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 A majority of young Dungan respondents 
indicated that their parents encouraged them 
to work while receiving secondary education. 
However, unlike as was previously noted for 
many Turkish and Kurdish families, the reasons 
given by young Dungan respondents pointed 
less towards an economic necessity to contribute 
to family budgets, but rather to a desire to 
either have their ‘own cash’ (in urban areas) or to 
simply ‘help’ parents with their farming (in rural 
areas). As the following quote hints, the mind-set 
here might be more about mutual support and 
developing a working attitude than about actual 
material gains: 
‘Basically all of us here have fields. Well, we 
helped parents. Not to say that we worked, 
we just helped parents after classes.’
 With regard to success in post-secondary 
education, there were recognisable advantages for 
those young Dungans who had the opportunity 
to attend extracurricular programmes because 
they lived in, or close enough to, an urban setting 
where these were available to them (as was also 
true for representatives of other ethnic groups). 
The following quote from a young Dungan woman 
from Bishkek, who studied at the prestigious 
Kyrgyz-Russian-Slavic University, illustrates that, 
aside from parental support and financial ability, 
geographic location can significantly impact on 
youth’s opportunity structures in Kyrgyzstan:
‘Probably, there were no such difficulties, 
because during the whole of 11th grade I 
already attended preparatory courses of the 
“Slavic” university where they prepared us for 
the entrance exams. That is to say, I deliberately 
prepared for entering exactly IR [International 
Relations] at KRSU [Kyrgyz-Russian-Slavic 
University].
 The observation that particular locations 
affected young Dungans’ opportunities was also 
true for marriage decisions. Female Dungans from 
Karakol reported that they enjoy a considerable 
degree of freedom to choose a husband of their 
personal liking, even if this process also involves 
negotiations with their parents, who would still 
impose certain restrictions. In contrast, female 
Dungan respondents from the similarly sized city 
of Tokmok indicated that in this more ‘traditional’ 
setting (as compared to Karakol) parents would 
clearly dominate when selecting an appropriate 
spouse, and that daughters tended to accept this 
situation.11
 Young Dungan males and females, in 
most cases regardless of family background, 
age and gender, expressed the desire to pursue 
higher education. For example, all female Dungan 
respondents from Issyk-Kul oblast indicated that 
after their marriage and motherhood, they had 
re-enrolled in their original university and had 
now successfully graduated. Nevertheless, as was 
the case for the Russian and other ethnic groups, 
it was also common among Dungan university 
graduates that their later employment was not in 
their field of specialisation.
 Respondents explained unexpected 
professional situations, such as those of a trained 
software engineer working as a hairdresser, or an 
economics graduate being a supermarket cashier, 
as the result of un-informed choices that they 
had made about their study programmes. Young 
Dungans remarked that they felt neglected by 
school teachers, who were largely disinterested 
in guiding them to a suitable choice of university 
and subject. But parents also apparently did 
not provide useful input on this matter, as they 
usually suggested classic professions, such as 
doctor, teacher or economist, without taking into 
account actual labour market demands. Other 
respondents also expressed frustration about the 
quality of the actual qualifications that can be 
earned at universities where bribery is inevitable 
and endemic. As a result students stopped 
attending classes and simply paid-up: 
‘In the second semester we were smarter about 
this. Anyway she [the teacher] takes money. 
Why then [go]? Then we are better not to go 
at all…’
 Migration among young male and female 
Dungans was not observed. But in contrast to other 
cases presented in this report, this was framed as 
a choice to stay, rather than as a constraint on 
their ability to leave. Female Dungan respondents 
reflected that discrimination in their workplaces 
in Kyrgyzstan would occur on grounds of their 
gender, ethnic belonging and age. A widespread 
lack of Kyrgyz language skills among Dungans 
was also identified as a highly salient factor for 
constraining economic opportunities.
 
11This observation can also be linked to the fact that Dungans in Issyk-Kul oblast and those in Chuy oblast belong to different ethnic sub-groups, which 
have quite different settlement histories in Kyrgyzstan. Whereas the Dungans of the Issyk-Kul area arrived there as early as the1870s, and thus were 
exposed to ‘Soviet modernity’ early on, the Dungans of Chuy resettled from China only from the1950s onwards, and thus are understood to maintain a 
comparatively more ‘traditional’ way of life.
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 Uighur Youth
 Young Uighur respondents depicted a 
broad variety of decision-making configurations in 
their families, from male to female predominance, 
to gender-equal councils. In addition, in regard to 
domestic chores, respondents noted that husbands 
would usually help their wives to manage the 
household. One respondent offered the following 
perspective, which presented an interesting 
invitation to reflect on the female vigour concealed 
behind upfront displays of patriarchy:
‘Mum is the coordinator, she knows everything. 
Even when dad does not know something, she 
knows it. On the other hand, I understand that 
our society, no matter how patriarchal it seems 
to be, is matriarchal from the inside. The whole 
society is supported by women. The illusion of 
patriarchy is just a golden varnish (spraying).’
 In contrast to what has been noted about 
Dungan youth in the previous paragraph, only a 
few Uighur respondents indicated that they would 
work while attending secondary school. Parents’ 
primary preference was presented as a desire that 
young people should focus on their studies, even 
if a family was experiencing financial troubles. As 
this case of an Uighur female student illustrates, 
that perspective apparently extends into the realm 
of higher education:
‘I went to Bishkek. I said that I will work. I will 
study and work simultaneously. They [parents] 
said, no, you will not. You will first complete your 
studies, get your thing, and then after a certain 
time, you can…’
 Furthermore, the following quote from a 
young Uighur male about how he imagined his 
future married life also points to continuing female 
education as a possible option after marriage:
‘Yes, because I want my wife to strive for 
something. Because education is always a way 
to open up someone’s potential. I am for it.’
 With regard to workplace discrimination, 
Uighur respondents remarked that this would 
happen on grounds of ethnicity and gender. Age, 
and the pressure that young professionals would 
be exposed to from their older colleagues, were 
also aspects highlighted by one male Uighur 
respondent: 
‘If you are young, to most of the elder people 
it means you are inexperienced and unskilled. 
Therefore, you cannot be trusted in certain 
delicate issues and at certain moments.’
 Uighur respondents considered 25 years 
to be the ideal age for young women to marry. 
In line with the gender perceptions presented 
with regard to education, young Uighur males 
expressed that they were in favour of their wives 
being employed when they imagined their future 
married life. Quite in contrast to the perception 
of most other male respondents in this report, 
Uighur men went beyond thoughts of improving 
the family budget while reasoning about working 
women. As the following two quotes show, this 
concerned material as well as emotional support, 
and the view that working would diversify a wife’s 
lifeworld:
‘First of all, I am going to listen attentively to 
how her workday went. Show interest in the 
progress of her work. Try to pay attention to her. 
If she is tired, I will cook dinner myself, organise 
some leisure activity for the two of us, kind of a 
romantic date in nature…’
‘Having a job for a woman is not just a 
professional activity for her, it is also a chance to 
diversify her life. I think women who sit at home 
run out of their minds, get dull, become irritable. 
Let them work. Let them make money and find a 
common language with colleagues and create a 
circle of communication.’
 Discussion
 The examination of smaller minority 
groups widened the spectrum of perceptions 
on gender relations and on the distribution of 
opportunities in contemporary Kyrgyzstan. This 
enabled a further contextualisation of what 
already has been noted for young ethnic Kyrgyz, 
Uzbek and Russian males and females.
 In regard to how youth’s social and cultural 
embeddedness related to perceptions on family, 
education, employment and other topics, the 
responses from the Tajik group revealed most 
similarities with those of their Uzbek peers. To 
begin with, this concerned the strong tendency 
among male household heads to prevent female 
(geographic and social) mobility in order to 
safeguard family reputation. It could accordingly 
be observed that the consequence of presenting 
‘sabr’ as the primary quality for female role 
models was to ‘normalise’ female discrimination 
within everyday life. Also related to this was the 
reference that family matters, including domestic 
violence, could better be handled by informal 
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councils of local elders (aksakals) than by law 
enforcement agencies. A discord was noticeable 
between different generations of Tajiks, as part 
of which the elder generation’s criticism of 
deteriorating family and community ties could 
be read as an anxiety about loosening social 
control. This was in light of a younger generation 
who, especially if equipped with superior income 
from labour migration to Russia, advocated for 
a change in gender perceptions and aspired to 
seeing future wives being more educated and 
able to contribute to family budgets.
 Insights on early school dropouts, 
exceptionally early forced marriages (through 
bride-kidnapping) and strictly patriarchal 
family structures made the Kurdish and Turkish 
communities appear to be located at the very 
‘traditional’ end of the spectrum of gender 
perceptions. A one-dimensional orientation 
on agricultural labour, and the limited income 
opportunities associated with this, could be 
identified as a major factor as to why female 
biographies in these communities were 
rigorously defined through marriage and 
without regard to female academic or other 
future potential. Within local communities this 
was justified by highlighting the fact that families 
have only recently recognised the advantages of 
continued education for male siblings. In light of 
this, the voice of an Islamic cleric, who resolutely 
argued for the necessity of female education 
and mobility in a modern society, stood out. He 
remarked that he himself intended to send his 
daughter to a medical college.
 In regard to their participation in family 
decision-making and access to education or 
employment, the responses of Dungan women 
underlined the importance of location for 
shaping youth opportunities. Whereas in the 
‘liberal environment’ of Karakol (Issyk-Kul oblast) 
females reported being actively involved in the 
process of selecting husbands, and later would 
also have equal work opportunities to them, 
this was less the case in Tokmok (Chuy oblast), 
a city of similar size and also located in the 
northern part of Kyrgyzstan. A desire to obtain 
higher education degrees was widespread 
among young Dungan males and females, and 
respondents from Karakol in fact indicated that 
they had re-enrolled and successfully graduated 
following a break upon marriage and initial 
motherhood. But many Dungan respondents 
also criticised a lack of guidance by teachers and 
parents when choosing a university and subject, 
and subsequently would often fail to secure 
adequate employment in their actual field of 
specialisation.
 Young male and female Uighurs presented 
educational achievements as highly important in 
their everyday lifeworlds, which was also reflected 
in the fact that, unlike their Dungan peers, they 
were often prohibited by their parents to work 
alongside their school or even university studies. 
Female education and later employment were 
judged very favourably, which corresponded 
with a later idealised age for female marriage 
of 25. Furthermore, young Uighur males, quite 
unlike their peers of other ethnic belonging, 
showed an advanced awareness of the meaning 
of ‘work’ within female self-perceptions. Going 
beyond mentioning only the collective aspect 
of how a woman’s material contribution would 
improve a family budget, young Uighur men 
proclaimed their readiness to provide working 
wives with an environment of proactive 
support, as opposed to just passively ‘allowing’ 
them to take up employment, as long as they 
continued managing the household chores. At 
this time, such statements might not represent a 
predominant opinion even among Uighur males, 
and often merely suggested a possible future for 
married life voiced by respondents who were still 
bachelors. Still, the ability to reflect on the ways 
in which, for example, workplace socialising 
could expand and diversify a woman’s lifeworld 
can be seen as a rare indication of emphatic care 
for the other gender’s overall wellbeing.
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Cross-cutting Perspectives: 
Language, Location, Violence, 
Information and ‘Being Young’
During the interviews and focus group discussions, young people of different ethnic belonging highlighted particular 
aspects of their gender perceptions and 
opportunity structures. However it should not 
simply be concluded from this that any one 
such aspect would be relevant and ‘typical’ only 
for the members of a particular ethnic group. 
To account for the fact that young males and 
females in Kyrgyzstan share views, constraints 
and opportunities beyond their ethnic belonging, 
the following section will develop a cross-cutting 
perspective and aim to assess the varying degrees 
to which this could be observed. In the context of 
Kyrgyzstan, this seems important also in order to 
counter a trend of ‘ethnicisation’, i.e. the automatic 
assignment of certain ‘traditions’ or ‘traits’ to all 
representatives of one ethnic group (a practise 
that is prone to be instrumentalised for political 
agendas and can be identified as a continuation 
of Soviet nationalities policy).12
 Such a perspective is also captured in the 
title chosen for the present report. ‘Displays of 
Patriarchy and Female Vigour’ is intended to express 
that many aspects of the everyday interactions 
between men and women in Kyrgyzstan tend to 
oscillate and are being negotiated in-between 
these poles. Depending on ethnic belonging, 
but also on other parameters such as place of 
residence, a display of patriarchy may be rather 
rhetorical, while in fact female vigour is the actual 
shaping force of opportunities. Such a concept 
was, for example, referred to as ‘pragmatic 
patriarchy’13 among respondents of the Kyrgyz 
group.14 Yet a display of patriarchy might equally 
be forceful, i.e. not only a matter of discourse, but 
strictly structuring the trajectories of families and 
female biographies. Then female vigour is still 
present and even definitive, but may be concealed 
behind gendered performances of patience and 
perseverance (sabr), as could be observed among 
Uzbek or Tajik15 respondents.16
12 Reeves (2010), for example, discusses ethnicisation and ethnic nationalism in relation to the violence in southern Kyrgyzstan in 2010. Marat (2016) 
presents the discourse of a group of ‘civic-minded nationalists’.
   For further illustrations, see Cummings (2008) and Gullette (2010).
13Referring to the transition from Soviet to early post-Soviet life, Kuehnast (1997, 1998) has described the approach of Kyrgyz women as ‘collaborative 
conservatism’, merging Kyrgyz ‘traditionalism’ with an‘openness’ to societal change. Schröder (2015b) provides a recent case study on the geographic 
and social mobility of a young Kyrgyz woman. Ismailbekova (2016) reflects on how women can create authority ‘through custom’ and during their 
life-courses develop ‘domestic power’.
14Handrahan (2001) discusses the connection of ethnicity and gender among ethnic Kyrgyz in light of Soviet history, being Muslim, ‘tribalism’ and 
‘Western influence’. See also Kandiyoti (2007).
15 Harris (2004) employs the term ‘gender masks’ to research negotiations of social order in Tajik families and in the Tajik state. See also Harris (2006).
16 Sucha spectrum of possible realities is also captured in Kandiyoti’s (2002) notion of ‘bargaining with patriarchy’, which describes the emergence of 
gendered subjectivities and women’s rather active or passive resistances to gender oppression as an outcome of strategic negotiations oriented on 
particular contextual ‘rules of the game’.
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 Language (and Ethnicisation)
 Language could be identified as an 
influential factor affecting the opportunity 
structures of all young Kyrgyzstani respondents. 
Within the country, it could be observed that 
Kyrgyz language skills have become important 
in order to access certain areas of employment, 
in particular the public sector. This was remarked 
upon, for example, by some of the young Russian 
and Dungan respondents. In line with Uzbek 
respondents, they also pointed out that, in a 
nepotistic labour market, which privileged ethnic 
Kyrgyz, the professional ambitions of minority 
groups would be constrained.17 Ethnic economic 
niches could be identified from the interview 
responses, such as within the technical and 
service-oriented industries for ethnic Russians18 in 
northern Kyrgyzstan, or inself-employment in the 
private sector for young Uzbeks in the country’s 
south.19
 With regard to education, the situation 
was depicted differently. Mono-linguistic Russian 
speakers, or members of smaller minority groups 
who had developed skills in Russian rather 
than in Kyrgyz, generally did not report being 
limited in their secondary or tertiary educational 
aspirations. In contrast, Uzbek respondents in 
southern Kyrgyzstan indicated that following their 
secondary education, for which they could attend 
dedicated Uzbek-language schools, their transition 
into higher education was complicated by the fact 
that nowadays the national university admissions 
test cannot any longer be taken in the Uzbek 
language, but only in Kyrgyz or Russian. With 
few higher education facilities offering classes in 
Uzbek, this language’s general functionality20 to 
increase educational or professional opportunities 
in contemporary Kyrgyzstan is rather low, which 
gains further significance in light of the ethnic 
Uzbek’s strong regional presence in the country’s 
southern areas.
 Location
 In many ways, the geographical locations 
in which the young respondents of this report have 
grown up or currently dwell could be observed to 
matter for how young people perceive gender 
relations and realise opportunities. Different scales 
could be identified as playing a role, ranging from 
inter- to intra-regional tendencies (northern and 
southern Kyrgyzstan), to differences between 
urban and rural areas. Examining these patterns, 
the ethnic groups inhabiting southern Kyrgyzstan 
could in fact be identified as reflecting stronger 
displays of patriarchy that constrained female social 
and mobilities. For example, the aforementioned 
‘short courses’, in which young females developed 
income-generating skill-sets based around 
domestic skills, were mentioned to be a popular 
trend in the country’s south, including within 
Kyrgyz, Uzbek and Tajik communities. By contrast, 
such courses did not feature in the responses of 
female respondents of different ethnic belonging 
from Kyrgyzstan’s northern region. With a few 
exceptions, which could be observed especially in 
Turkish and Kurdish communities, young women 
of the north seemed to predominantly pursue 
higher education. An interesting intra-regional 
and intra-ethnic variation could be observed 
among Dungan respondents, who reported that 
young females in the rather ‘liberal’ city of Karakol 
would enjoy more opportunities to influence their 
educational career and choice of future husband 
than their peers in Tokmok, a city of similar size 
and located in the neighbouring oblast, close to 
the capital Bishkek, but apparently with a more 
‘conservative’ social environment.
 Another significant difference for how 
gender relations were framed and opportunities 
distributed could be observed to exist between 
urban and rural domains. Generally, urban 
locations, especially the major cities of Bishkek 
and Osh, were indicated as providing more 
opportunities for youth of different ethnic 
belonging.21 This concerned both the objective 
17It should be noted, however, that, for ethnic Kyrgyz, employment opportunities are structured - facilitated or constrained - beyond this primary 
observation. Usually, developing a career for a young Kyrgyz is a matter of personal networks whose assembly is more complex than simply large-
scale categorisations of clan or regional belonging (‘north vs. south’), and may depend, for example, on the father of a school friend or on superiors 
in a law-enforcement agency. On the links between ethnicity, language and religion in Kyrgyzstan, see Chotaeva (2004).
18 Kosmarskaya (1996, 2006) provides insights into the situation of Russians in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan, including discriminatory experiences of an 
‘everyday [Kyrgyz] nationalism’.
19Ismailbekova (2013) discusses ‘coping strategies’ among ethnic Uzbeks in southern Kyrgyzstan in the aftermath of the 2010 violent events, among 
which were ‘public avoidance’, migration and early marriage (as mentioned before in this report).
20Korth (2001, 2004, 2005) has conducted extensive research on Kyrgyz language revival and the aspect of education and linguistic division, as well 
as on attitudes towards languages in Kyrgyzstan.
21See Kirmse’s observations (2009, 2013) on ‘youth spaces’ and their relationship to donor-funded activities in the city of Osh.
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availability of certain opportunities, for example 
preparatory courses for university enrolment 
exams, as well as the subjective understanding of 
whether it would be legitimate for young women 
to make use of them. An additional factor was that 
family budgets in urban contexts were generally 
described as including allowances for investing in 
a daughter’s or son’s education. 
 By contrast, in more traditional 
communities the primary concern was about 
the family’s reputation as determined by views 
of the community. In such situations, to seize an 
opportunity that would be considered common 
in the city, such as to enable a daughter to enter 
university, demands considerably more struggle 
against the pressures to prevent outliers (potentially 
within and outside their own family). The case 
referred to here which was recounted by an Uzbek 
mother, furthermore showed that such patriarchal 
environments could not only be found in villages, 
but also within tightly-knit urban neighbourhoods 
of the mahalla22 ‘type’ (which werealso found to 
exist and to exhibit similar social effects among 
Tajik and Kyrgyz small-scale communities).
 Violence
 The responses of young Kyrgyzstanis 
allowed for the recognition of pervasive experiences 
of violence and abuse of different sorts, from 
physical and emotional violence to verbal and 
financial abuse or neglect. ‘Talking about violence 
remains a strong taboo and by most respondents 
was considered a private matter that should not be 
brought to the attention of official bodies, but was 
to be handled inside the family or reconciled by 
local, informal institutions (such as elder councils).’
 Charts 1 and 2 indicate whom among 
the young male and female respondents would 
‘completely agree’ or ‘rather agree’ with the 
statement ‘Domestic violence is an internal family 
issue, no one should know about it, it is a shame’. 
Within the Russian group only 13% of females 
and 27% of males voiced their agreement. In the 
Kyrgyz group this rose to 24% of females and 
66% of males, and in the Uzbek group to 40% of 
females and 50% of males.
 
22 On the Uzbek mahalla as a socio-spatial field for urban dwelling and the ‘cultivation’ of proper personhood in southern Kyrgyzstan, see Liu (2012).
Chart 1: Domestic violence is an internal family issue, no one should know about it, it is a shame. 
  (Female respondents)
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23Kleinbach (2003; et al. 2005; and Salimjanova 2007) has carried out extensive research on the issue of bride-kidnapping among Kyrgyz. Werner 
(2009) discusses the connection of bride-kidnapping with patriarchy and local discourses of shame and tradition.
24Another such audience are local courts of elders (aksakals). Beyer (2015) reveals how these traditional institutions ‘customise law’ in Kyrgyzstan. 
A recent report by Human Rights Watch (2015) critically remarks that with their focus on reconciliation, such elders’ courts can limit the access to 
‘measures of redress’ for survivors of domestic violence. 
25Ismailbekova (2014) outlines the potentially dominant role of women in cases of male absence, such as due to migration.
Chart 2: Domestic violence is an internal family issue, no one should know about it, it is a shame. 
   (Male respondents)
 Violence may also be condemned as part 
of public moral discourse (what should be said 
to strangers), but still it was noticeable from the 
interviews that the barriers to resorting to violence 
are low, and perpetrators often do not need to 
fear serious legal or social consequences (such 
as restraining orders, community ostracisation or 
divorce).
 Judging from the insights that young males 
and females of different ethnic belonging offered 
into everyday life in Kyrgyzstan, violence could 
thus be identified as a feasible means to enforce 
patriarchal agendas. This included, for example, 
cases of bride-kidnapping within Kyrgyz or Turkish 
and Kurdish communities23, which predominantly 
were not perceived as criminal acts of deprivation 
of liberty. It also included domestic violence or 
verbal abuse deployed in order to ‘discipline’ wives 
who were considered negligent of household 
chores, or who were failing to manage these 
satisfactorily alongside their employment. While 
such violence was reported to occur within almost 
all ethnic groups, alcohol abuse as a catalyst for 
domestic violence was primarily mentioned by 
Russian respondents. (Yet it must be noted here 
as well that this group showed the least reserve in 
verbalising violent experiences.)
 Ultimately, the accounts of young 
Kyrgyzstanis attest that violence, abuse and neglect 
emerge primarily as a show of masculinity that is 
culturally legitimised by different audiences. These 
are male peer groups which, for example, challenge 
a man on whether he is able to keep his ‘dominant’ 
working wife in check;24 but also females could be 
identified as being complicit, such as a mother-
in-law who criticises the household performance 
of her son’s new wife and does not oppose his 
disciplinary measures against her.25
 Charts 3 and 4 use quantitative data to 
show how many respondents of different ethnic 
groups either ‘completely agree’ or ‘rather agree’ 
with the statement ‘Physical abuse is preferable 
over divorce’. Separated into male and female 
respondents, this shows that within the Kyrgyz 
group only 8% of women and 18% of men agree 
with this statement, whereas in the Uzbek group 
these numbers are higher: 35% of women and 
41% of men. Among Russian respondents 17% 
of females and 9% of males agree with this 
statement.
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Chart 3: Physical abuse is preferable over divorce. (Female respondents)
Chart 4: Physical abuse is preferable over divorce. (Male respondents)
 From this emerges the necessity to identify 
alternative moral sources that can be promoted 
in order to oppose acts of violence and abuse in 
marriage and elsewhere, which so far tend to be 
legitimised by women’s passive acceptance of 
the need to ‘show patience’ (sabr kyl) that part of 
society encourages. In focus group discussions, 
for example, it was Islamic clerics in particular who 
pointed to religious tenets in order to criticise 
currently predominant ‘traditionalist’ patterns26, 
such as early marriage, the violent disciplining of 
women and the neglect of female education.
26McBrien (2009) discusses the nexus of ‘veiling and modernity’ in contemporary Kyrgyzstan. On a ?higher level (or is this a ‘wider platform’??), 
Montgomery (2015) provides insights on how ‘Muslims experience democracy and the state in Kyrgyzstan’.
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 Flow of information
 Beyond the obvious need to reject violent 
acts on moral grounds and classify violent acts as 
a human rights issue in the absence of effective 
implementation of relevant laws, these must as well 
be understood as an inability to verbalise frustration 
and anxieties. This links to the observation that 
boundaries between genders tend to harden 
with a lack of knowledge about each other’s lives, 
including little awareness of mutual expectations 
or of potential for compromise. From the responses 
of young Kyrgyzstani males, it could be concluded 
that quite a few of them find themselves faced 
with a kind of ‘masculine silence’, i.e. within their 
all-male peer groups they are not provided with 
a forum for expressing personal concerns about 
their own emotional states or the challenges they 
face when relating to the opposite sex.27
 Further barriers for cross-gender 
communication on a wide range of ‘delicate 
topics’, especially sexuality, were reported to be 
present within families, meaning among siblings 
or between children and parents. Charts 5 and 
6 present the main sources from which youth of 
different ethnic groups obtain information on 
sexually transmitted diseases (STD) and HIV/AIDS. 
Separated into male and female respondents, this 
shows that more young men turn to friends or 
schoolmates (Kyrgyz: 36%, Uzbek: 36%, Tajik: 33%) 
for information on these topics than their female 
peers do (Kyrgyz: 27%, Uzbek: 16%, Tajik: 17%). At 
the same time, far fewer young males apparently 
discuss these matters with their parents (Kyrgyz: 
13%, Uzbek: 9%, Tajik: 0%) than young women 
do (Kyrgyz: 25%, Uzbek: 29%, Tajik: 13%). In 
addition, young Kyrgyzstanis in general indicated 
that they utilise multiple other sources to improve 
their knowledge on STD and HIV/AIDS, ranging 
from mass media and the internet to medical 
institutions, NGOs and schools.
26 For the urban context of Bishkek, Schröder (2012, 2014) has provided insights on social integration among male youth, including the hesitation to 
verbalise emotions within peer-group settings.
Chart 5: Where do/did you get information about STD and HIV/AIDS? (Female respondents)
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 Respondents also did not mention any 
male-female friendship relations, which would 
potentially be sources for gaining first-hand insights 
into the other sex’s mind-set and reasoning. On 
the other hand, it could be noticed that in regards 
to the (admittedly less delicate) topic of ‘working 
women’, those young males who reported having 
had experiences of their own mothers or sisters 
being employed were better able to move beyond 
strict gender perceptions, such as assigning the 
domestic sphere exclusively to females. However, 
the general paucity of such glimpses across the 
gender divide could be understood to further 
fuel speculation and stereotyping, as could be 
observed, for example, in regard to the mistrust 
of the ‘female character’ that existed among 
those men who tended to project a zero-sum-
perspective onto male-female relations.
 Aside from gender relations, both young 
male and female respondents were critical of how 
information was disseminated when it came to 
the important task of selecting an appropriate 
post-secondary education track, and thus a 
future profession that would present them with 
acceptable income opportunities.28 The interviews 
revealed the difficulties that Kyrgyzstani youth 
face when consulting parents and teachers 
who are unmotivated or ill-informed on these 
matters, or when their choice is not based on 
current labour market demands but rather on 
perceptions of what are ‘prestigious’ professions 
or universities.29
28 DeYoung (2011) has published widely on education in Kyrgyzstan, for example as regards ‘university experiences’ 
   (2010), problems and trends in the secondary education sector (2006) and the ‘erosion of social upbringing’ in schools
   (2007). Further contributions on the topic of education were provided by Shamatov (2013) and Merrill (2013).
29 This is also discussed in Schröder (2011).
Chart 6: Where do/did you get information about STD and HIV/AIDS? (Male respondents)
Re
se
ar
ch
 o
n 
Pr
of
es
si
on
al
 a
nd
 M
ar
ria
ge
 C
ho
ic
es
 o
f Y
ou
th
 in
 K
yr
gy
zs
ta
n
54
 Being Young
 It could be observed that, as part of a 
gendered upbringing within most ethnic groups 
captured in this report, young women were 
expected to take over more household and other 
domestic responsibilities, while their male siblings 
were permitted time for extracurricular activities, of 
both an educational and leisure nature. Although 
the public behaviour of young males was also 
perceived to reflect on a family’s reputation, this 
reasoning appeared to matter more for young 
women, with the paramount requirement being to 
maintain the image of raising a ‘good daughter’. 
In consequence, opportunity structures for young 
women were found to be narrower, in regards to 
their physical mobility to leave the parental home 
and their potential to allocate time autonomously. 
 The major rationale for this seemed to be 
provided by the functioning of the local marriage 
market, which among young Kyrgyzstanis 
of all ethnic groups could be identified as a 
priority orientation when imagining their future 
biographies. Within that marriage market, a 
family stood to lose more from a ‘misbehaving’ 
daughter, whom they might have trouble 
matching with a husband and who thus could 
remain a burden as an additional family member, 
than from a ‘misbehaving’ son, who according to 
patrilineal principles will be associated with his 
natal kin-group for life (and beyond). Following 
that particular market logic, the demand-side of 
future husbands ended up dictating the terms 
for the supply-side of future wives. In practice, 
such disparity was highlighted when respondents 
referred to the low expectations for what qualified 
as a good husband, i.e. ‘someone who does not 
drink, smoke or beat’.
 Displays of patriarchy also concerned 
the older generation’s perception of younger 
Kyrgyzstanis. Especially in focus group discussions 
on the topic of sexual education, quite a large 
number of parents expressed concerns about 
their children’s ability to handle information on 
this matter without slipping into promiscuity. This 
reflected a more general scepticism on adolescence 
within the human lifecycle, which understood 
this transition from child- to adulthood not as an 
opportunity for someone to develop a responsible 
personality, but as a period when young males 
and females could be easily seduced into 
delinquencies of any sort.30 Therefore, parenting 
appeared to be focused strongly on protecting 
youth from ‘negative influences’ by means of social 
control, which adolescent males and females, 
however, often experienced as a disproportionate 
prejudgment on their decision-making ability, 
that constrained them from pursuing essential 
opportunities.
 In Kyrgyzstan the transition from youth into 
adulthood is commonly understood to be marked 
by marriage rather than by age.31 Accordingly, it 
should be noted that a push towards marriage at 
a young age is not always instigated exclusively 
by parents, but such a step may also be related to 
youth’s aspirations for a status change and new 
agency. Regardless of the fact that this transition 
entails new and serious responsibilities, such 
as for a young man to become a breadwinner 
and for a young woman to become a mother, 
marriage tends to be imagined as also opening up 
new freedoms from the aforementioned parental 
scrutiny.32
 However, this again appeared to be 
more the case for young males than females, as 
the latter often depicted their new position of 
daughter-in-law (kelin) as also being characterised 
by vulnerability and the need to prove themselves 
as ‘being worthy’. For young males, although 
there also seems to be significant peer-pressure 
not to marry much later than their friends or 
male relatives of similar age, the new status of a 
‘married man’ promises to move the husband up 
the hierarchy of conditional decision-making. For 
example, this could be noticed when young Uzbek 
women mentioned that whether or not they would 
work would be a decision for their husbands.
 Charts 7 and 8 illustrate this further, 
indicating the number of respondents from 
different ethnic groups who either ‘completely 
agree’ or ‘rather agree’ with the statement ‘Now 
both partners in a marriage should also seek 
fulfilment in a job/career’. Separated into male 
and female respondents, this shows that 89% 
of both Kyrgyz and Uzbek women, and 87% of 
Russian women, indicated that they agree with this 
statement, while among men, 68% of Kyrgyz and 
82% of Russians agree, but only 41% of Uzbeks. 
30 Taking the example of ‘youth work’ in local youth centres of northern Kyrgyzstan, Schröder (2015a) provides insights on the perception of youth by 
the elder generation and on gender among young males and females. Furthermore, a critical perspective on youth can be identified as a continuation 
of the Soviet practice, in connection with which Pilkington (1994) noted a binary opposition that perceived ‘youth-as-constructors-of-communism’ 
vs. ‘youth-as-victims-of-Western-influence’, with the latter group being more likely to become ‘lost’ and ‘delinquent’.
31 On this aspect, see also Schröder (2011).
32 In the case of Tajikistan, Roche (2014) has described this as practices of ‘domesticating youth’.
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Chart 7: Now both partners in a marriage should also seek fulfilment in a job/career. (Female respondents)
Chart 8: Now both partners in a marriage should also seek fulfilment in a job/career. (Male respondents).
 Furthermore, it could be observed that 
displays of patriarchy concerned not only the unequal 
distribution of male and female opportunities, 
but also the unequal valuation of their respective 
contributions. Before or after marriage, the 
manifestations of female efforts, regardless of whether 
these related to education, domestic work, child-
rearing or employment, tended to be downplayed 
and ‘taken for granted’ in comparison to those of 
their male counterparts. This was vividly illustrated 
in cases where working wives were criticised, not 
only by their husbands but also by other women 
or even themselves, for failing to properly manage 
the double burden of being entirely responsible for 
the domestic domain while doing their professional 
job at the same time. Another illustration of this 
concerned the symbolic exaltation of male income 
as more ‘blessed’, even if, as in the case of the 
‘housemen’ of Naryn, the actual contribution might 
be comparatively low. While addressing the unequal 
sharing of responsibilities and lack of appreciation 
of their efforts during the interviews, many working 
women underlined the social and emotional benefits 
that would come with employment, especially 
their elevated self-confidence and opportunities to 
socialise with colleagues.
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Awareness raising campaign against all forms of violence against girls
With internet resources accessible to youth across Kyrgyzstan and the internet being a media platform 
popular with youth, internet and specifically mobile phone based applications lend themselves as tools to carry 
out a systematic and targeted awareness raising campaign against all forms of gender based violence, and 
against discriminatory cultural practices and gender-roles in family and society, early marriage, and educational 
discrimination against women. The campaign should be driven by individual activists and supported by 
interested organizations that provide evidence and data to guide discussion.
Sub Recommendations:
To produce short video clips and infographics presenting 
research findings and evidence to catch the attention of 
youth.
To have celebrities in popular culture and the arts, 
opinion-makers in the media, business leaders and well-
known individuals in society who have influence over 
youth to advocate against harmful practices and beliefs 
that hinder empowerment of young women and men.
To commission youth artists to produce visual art 
including comics covering research findings on gender-
based discrimination and girl empowerment successes 
for a teen audience.
To whom:
Local NGOs, INGOs, UN bodies, informal movements that 
advocate gender equality, activists; in close cooperation 
with the State Agency on Youth and Sports and Ministry 
of Culture, Information and Tourism. Use should be made 
of existing formal and informal networks of local youth 
organizations, specifically the nationwide network of UN 
Women peer-educators.
Beneficiaries: Youth but specifically those age 14 to 22.
Inputs required:
Budget for producing professional video clips. 
Participation of celebrities should be on a volunteer/pro-
bono basis. Preparation of information material to be part 
of regular work done by communications’ specialists of 
involved entities.
Additional comments:
Research material (final report, pillar reports, anonymized 
primary data) is to be handled in an unbiased, culturally 
and ethnically sensitive manner. Partners should sign an 
agreement specifying terms and conditions of the use 
and storage of the anonymized research data.
 Recommendations
 Actions to be taken as proposed by the research team in relation to the general 
recommendations made in the final report
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Summer school on conducting engendered social science research
Considering often limited capacity of young Kyrgyzstan-based researchers in conducting social science 
research, and specifically in relation to applying the mixed methods approach, and in order to expand the 
cadre of professional researchers it is recommended to organize a summer school on conducting engendered 
social science research. The target group is both undergraduate and postgraduate students in the social 
sciences, and PhD students and young researchers. During the summer school participants are in an interactive, 
participatory learning environment and receive introductory courses on how to design, conduct, process and 
evaluate research projects using mixed methods, and applying the theoretical knowledge to individual/group 
based micro-research projects in gender-related thematic areas. The initiative will make a solid contribution 
to qualifying young researchers on qualitative research. Further, this cadre will be sensitized to the utility of 
engendered social science research.
Sub Recommendations:
The initiative should be implemented in cooperation with one of the 
universities offering undergraduate and postgraduate degrees in social 
sciences.
To whom: Universities with research faculties.
Timeframe: Summer 2017.
Beneficiaries: Undergraduate and postgraduate students, PhD candidates, young researchers and youth activists.
Required budget:
Premises and supplies to conduct classroom training;
research stipends for participants to conduct field research; computers 
supplied with QDA software or similar to process and analyse data; trainer 
services; accommodation and meals.
Additional comments: For field research, UN Women and partner institutions will select pertinent research topics/questions.
Introduction of ASRH education at all schools
Considering the general lack of knowledge among Kyrgyzstani adolescents on sexual and reproductive 
health and puberty issues, and given the absence of mandatory ASRH education, it is recommended to initiate 
a discussion on the mainstreaming of ASRH topics into the mandatory curriculum. ASRH experts, Ministry 
of Health, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Labour and Social Protection, UN Women, UNFPA, UNICEF and 
WHO and NGOs working on SRH issues should participate in working groups to identify an effective and 
culturally sensitive way to integrate ASRH education into mandatory subjects taught at secondary schools 
and universities. Infographics and video clips covering basic ASRH knowledge should be produced to WHO 
standard, as should be infographic material showing results of this research in relation to ASRH for distribution 
online. Focus group discussions with university students regarding what content should be presented, how 
and through which media should inform the curriculum.
Sub Recommendations:
Secondary school and university students should be involved in creation 
of material and in discussions. Short video clips should be produced 
presenting research findings to raise awareness.
To whom: Relevant government ministries, UN organisations, civil society actors.
Beneficiaries: Young people, specifically those age 14 to 22.
Required budget: Cost for curriculum revision and printing, and for teacher training.
Additional comments: Research material (final report, pillar reports, anonymized primary data) is to be handled in an unbiased, culturally/ethnically sensitive manner.
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Campaign on education and employment opportunities for girls
Organize campaigns on post-secondary educational opportunities, current and emerging labour market 
trends, and skills requirements for effective labor market participation especially for youth from remote areas 
and those not having full access to information. This to raise awareness on what career opportunities exist and 
how to take advantage of them to provide less advantaged youth groups with a range of options relating to 
their educational and career prospects.
Sub-recommendations
Education and career fairs to be held under the aegis of the Ministry 
of Education and the Ministry of Labor and Social Development with 
involvement of independent career experts, universities, post-secondary 
educational facilities, educational exchange programs, private sector 
companies.
- Guest speakers presenting success stories
- Information booths of educational facilities to inform on degrees 
and courses, on admission requirements, scholarships, etc.
- Information booths of private sector, non-commercial organisations, 
and state agencies on job and internship opportunities
- Career center with a professional photo booth, and consultancy on 
how to prepare job applications and for interviews
- International labor migration corner to inform on risks and 
opportunities of migration, and on legal and documentation issues
These events should enjoy broad media coverage and public visibility via 
TV, radio, and internet-based social networks
To whom:
Ministry of Education and Science, Ministry of Labour and Social 
Development, universities, colleges, career development experts, private 
sector companies, non-commercial entities, state agencies. The proposed 
activities should also be incorporated into ongoing educational projects 
implemented by stakeholders.
Timeframe:
Annually from September through December, to give senior school 
students/university graduates sufficient time to make informed decisions 
and undertake targeted preparation.
Beneficiaries:
Direct: young people, in particular those age 14 to 18
Indirect: participating universities, colleges, private companies and other 
organizations.
Required budget:
For hosting career fairs, production of information materials.
Information booths and the related logistic costs should be covered by 
participant universities, colleges, private companies and other organizations.
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Enhancing usefulness of the school curriculum to retain girls in secular education
Given the fact that girls from ethnic minority groups often drop out of school in favour of attending 
housework related commercial courses that close off their educational and career prospects, it is 
recommended to offer alternatives within the school curriculum to motivate girls and their parents to 
continue with secondary education. Life-skills modules such as basics of rural entrepreneurship, effective 
agriculture, financial management, computer literacy, sewing and cooking should be integrated in the 
existing mandatory labour subject or into compulsory extra-curricular activities for girls and also boys.
Sub-recommendations
Modules from the existing textbook ‘My Prosperous Farm’ which has been in 
used for many years with thousands of students at more than 100 secondary 
schools and where a cadre of trainers exists can be complemented by 
additional modules and courses to train livelihoods skills. Use should be 
made of the ‘My Safe and Peaceful School’ life-skills curriculum to empower 
youth and especially girls at secondary school. Both course have been 
approved by the state for use in public schools.
To whom:
Ministry of Education and Science, (I)NGOs and development partners 
working on relevant topics, independent experts in various disciplines. The 
proposed activities should also be incorporated to current educational 
projects and programmes.
Beneficiaries: Secondary school students and school teachers.
Required budget: Development of curriculum and printing costs, costs for teacher training.
Skills training for female migrant returnees
A large number of female migrants bring skills and sometimes also capital back to Kyrgyzstan. In the 
absence of an enabling environment that would permit migrants to deploy their assets the economy loses 
out and returnee women are unable to protect their rights as they cannot use their agency. Returnee female 
migrants should be given skills to deploy knowledge and capital as private entrepreneurs in Bishkek or their 
communities of origin. Such capacitation should include courses on how to develop a business plan, how to 
launch and grow a business, how to access financing, financial management of a business, marketing and 
targeted vocational training for female returnees from migration.
To whom: Ministry of Labour and Social Development, vocational training institutions, towns and municipalities, ILO, IOM, and other development partners.
To whom: Using local government budgets, skills training could be provided locally in towns and cities by qualified service providers.
Beneficiaries:
Female migrant returnees. Many female returnees of migration prefer 
not to return to their villages of origin fearing that they will lose hard-
earned independence and because of negative stereotyping of females 
in migration. They stay in Bishkek where they are exposed to multiple 
dangers.
Required budget: Use of local budgets plus development partner funding.
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